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Abstract 
 
News frames represent the way an issue is processed and presented by the media.  As 
such, news frames have great influence over public opinion and could therefore be 
useful in controlling a country’s image abroad.  This study builds upon existing 
literature and theories in an attempt to bring scholarship closer to an understanding of 
what frames are most likely to be effective for use in public diplomacy by identifying 
what frames and frame types currently influence audiences internationally.  
Specifically, The study examines what structures are commonly used to frame 
international issues, what frame content may not be accepted by a foreign audience and 
the extent to which elites control the local framing competition.  This thesis uses both a 
framing discourse analysis and a content analysis to evaluate news stories from 
American, Chinese and Vietnamese outlets as well as American elites.  The results 
found that while elites appear to control the general direction of framing in a country, 
American journalists are willing to suggest other frames as long as they enhance the 
drama of the narrative.  However, this storytelling imperative is not likely to cross a 
line into questioning the legitimacy of the media’s home country, indicating that such 
challenging messages should be avoided in public diplomacy.  Frequency of frame 
structure (conflict, responsibility and consequence) use was also identified, and a 
positive correlation found between privately owned media and use of consequence 
frame types.  Given the less antagonistic nature of these frame structures, they may be 
extremely effective in public diplomacy communications—as long as the right 
consequence is emphasised.  It is hoped that these findings will aid scholars and 
practitioners of public diplomacy in identifying effective ways to communicate 
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messages across countries, and that it will strengthen the argument for the role of 
‘listening’ in public diplomacy. 
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Introduction   
 Not long after September 11, 2001, when the American military began 
increasing its presence in the Middle East, the American government thought it might 
be worthwhile to improve the image of the United States abroad.  Rather than seeking 
to win a war directly, these undertakings were intended to foster local support for the 
American intervention in Afghanistan and, later, Iraq.  The hope was that this would 
translate to smoother relations between the Arab World and the Unite States.  Time 
and money was subsequently invested in projects designed to win the hearts and minds 
of Middle-Easterners.   
 One of the projects launched by the State Department involved American 
advertisement agencies pitching campaigns to help sell Brand U.S.A. to the Arab 
world.  Writer Shalom Auslander was working for one of these firms at the time, and 
recalls meetings intended to teach the American advertisers how to influence their 
target audience.  Unfortunately, these meetings only served to illuminate the 
complexity and quantity of factors shaping public opinion in the Middle East—history, 
religion, the economy, government—and how little was understood about how to 
affect that opinion.  Ultimately the firm gave up on the pitch: 
“After dozens of focus groups and tens of thousands of dollars, the only conclusion 
anyone could reach regarding the question of how to speak to Muslims was that 
nobody had any idea how to speak to Muslims.” (This American Life, 15 December 
2006) 
 
 This story was featured on This American Life, a weekly National Public Radio 
programme.  The title of the episode is ‘Shouting Across the Divide’—a metaphor for 
the challenge of cross-cultural communication.  What the device speaks to is the sense 
of futility, impossibility and frustration felt by the people who, through vocation or 
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circumstance, are charged with understanding and being understood in an unfamiliar 
context.  Judging by the State Department’s ultimate abandonment of the cross-cultural 
advertising project, the metaphor is fairly apt.   
 It is a peculiar paradox of a globalised age: though the physical barriers of 
international communication have been eliminated; though it is easy, fast and cheap to 
send a message across the world; though we have more media than ever to facilitate 
communication, we still have no idea how to actually talk to each other.  Now that we 
have the ability to speak, what can we say that will be both heard and understood?  The 
nature of communication remains grounded in cultural and political contexts and a 
message from one place will not be understood the same way in another.   
   One of the biggest problems of the State Department’s post-9/11 attempts at 
communicating with the Arab world was its unshakable concentration on promoting 
the United States in a way that makes sense to Americans.  Jennifer S. Bryson (2011: 
39-393) argues that “on the whole, we have been entirely too focused on promoting 
ourselves rather that seeking first to understand others.”  This lack of understanding 
ultimately results promotional messages that do not resonate with their intended 
audience.  The fact is, the same events or issues will be understood differently by 
different people, and without first identifying where common ground exists, we really 
are shouting across the divide.   After all, if the world were full of individuals who 
process information the exact same way, there’d be no real need to communicate with 
them at all. 
 In the face of seemingly insurmountable incompatibilities, Shalom Auslander’s 
story ends with the recommendation that we back off, and ‘let Muslims talk to 
Muslims’ (This American Life, 15 December 2006).  Unfortunately, the problems of 
international communication are not that easy to resolve, and simply ignoring global 
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connectedness is not an option in most cases.  Foreign policy, for instance, suffers 
when its intentions are misunderstood across the countries it effects.  Determining how 
to narrow the chasm between what is said by a government and what is heard by a 
foreign public is one of the major tasks of public diplomacy—an interdisciplinary field 
that focuses on communication of foreign policies and national identities.   
 The driving idea behind this field is that by demonstrating the existence of 
compatible attitudes and ideas, foreign cultures can avoid conflicts.  Despite 
international miscommunication being as old as international communication itself, the 
field of public diplomacy is relatively new.  Though more and more scholarship is 
being devoted to public diplomacy research, there is still plenty of uncharted territory, 
particularly in the area of how to create messages that can be understood and effective 
across cultures.  Needed are studies honing in on the components of successful 
international communication, one element at a time, until the lessons from case studies 
can be compiled into a better understanding of how to talk to each other. 
 Through seeking out common ground in international issues framing, this 
research aims to add to existing scholarship on how to effectively communicate across 
culture.  Chapter 1 provides an overview of theory and research that contributes to our 
knowledge of international communication.  Specifically, the focus is on the use of 
international communication in mediated public diplomacy, the importance of news 
frames in shaping public opinion, and the use of framing in international 
communication.  Stemming from previous research, a research question and three 
hypotheses are also put forth here.  A methodology for answering the question and 
testing the hypotheses through content analysis of news coverage regarding certain 
international issues is developed in Chapter 2. 
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 This study examines news stories about four different international 
events/issues from China, Vietnam and the United States: the sovereignty conflict over 
the Spratly Islands, Vietnam’s petition to the United States for reparations for damage 
cause by Agent Orange, and criticism of human rights violations in China and 
Vietnam.  Chapters 3 through 6 discuss the nature and results of each case study.  Each 
case was chosen for relevance to the three countries as well as for qualities that may 
result in interesting findings for public diplomacy in the hopes of yielding useful 
information for scholars and practitioners of public diplomacy.   
 Finally, Chapter 7 takes the main findings from the case studies and identifies 
their bearing on public diplomacy.  Here, the results of the case studies are compiled 
and general conclusions are drawn regarding the frames that are most likely to 
influence a foreign public through mediate public diplomacy.  Hopefully, future public 
diplomacy campaigns will benefit from this research by applying the findings to real-
life cases.  Through this kind of theory development and testing we can move closer to 
an understanding of how to best narrow the divide in cross-cultural communication. 
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1.  Background 
 
Soft Power 
 
 Power can be thought of as the “ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes 
you want” (Nye, 2008: 94).  In international relations, we often see this manifested in 
threats (war, boycotts, tariffs etc.) or bribes (military protection, trade agreements, aid 
etc.).  Though more recently another kind of power has been identified as critical on 
the global stage.  Soft power is developed through attraction, in which power lies with 
the actor who can convince others that they all want the same outcomes.  Through 
using assets like an attractive culture, political values or institutions, shared 
preferences can be established (Nye, 2008: 95).  It is the power to coerce, rather than 
force.   
 Arguably, the most effective kind of power is that which goes unseen (Bottici 
and Challand, 2006: 330) and soft power fits this definition perfectly.  Nye (2004: 11) 
identifies three areas in which these qualities exist: culture, political values and foreign 
policies.  Culture refers to the appeal of a nation’s ideas, traditions and commodities.  
Cultural assets include music, cinema, art, literature, brands, consumer products and 
celebrities.  Political values are the beliefs and institutions that define the nation’s 
political systems.  Foreign policies are an extension of the nation’s political values 
towards actions outside of their borders.  These include economic assistance, 
humanitarian efforts, trade and tariffs, treaties and pacts and military intervention.  No 
one of these sources can be seen as unilaterally more important than the others, and all 
should be promoted as part of a campaign to improve soft power.  Public diplomats are  
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concerned with identifying which of these qualities other countries admire, and 
promoting them for the benefit of international relations.   
 
Creating Soft Power 
 
 Those seeking to improve a nation’s soft power have a number of available 
tools for use.  In Cull’s “Public diplomacy: taxonomies and histories” (2008), he 
presents five categories under which to classify actions that lead to increases in soft 
power, three of which will be relevant to this research1.  The first element identified is 
listening, which Cull emphasises “precedes all successful public diplomacy” (2008: 
32).  Listening is defined as “an actor’s attempt to manage the international 
environment by collecting and collating data about publics and their opinions overseas 
and using that data to redirect its policy or its wider public diplomacy approach 
accordingly” (Cull, 2008: 32).  Without incorporating this listening component into 
public diplomacy campaigns, messages are likely to fall flat.  If the messages 
communicated through public diplomacy are not attractive to the audience, then the 
message will not only be ineffective but may even foster negative sentiment towards 
the foreign government (Nye, 2008: 95).  How salient a public diplomacy message 
might be can be ‘heard’ through polls of focus groups of the target audience (Nye, 
2008: 95), giving diplomats the opportunity to tailor their messaging appropriately. 
 Advocacy is a way to improve soft power through promoting a specific policy, 
idea or even the general interests of the nation (Cull, 2008: 32).  Vehicles for advocacy 
include embassy press releases, government websites or informational materials.  
Advocacy is most often practiced by governmental organisations and, for this reason, 
                                                        1 The two omitted categories are ‘cultural diplomacy’ and ‘international exchanges’, 
which do not benefit from the communications approach that guides this research. 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may suffer from a lack of credibility.  It may be difficult for audiences to distinguish 
between advocacy and propaganda, which has negative connotations of manipulation 
and deception (Zaharna, 2004: 222-4).  Additionally, attempts at targeting specific 
audiences to promote a policy face difficulties in that a message intended for one 
audience can, and will, reach around the world thanks to efficient global media (Cull, 
2008: 48).  It no longer makes sense to try and target only one recipient to promote a 
state, since the message will be heard around the world.  Rather, it may be useful for 
advocates to remove themselves from advocating the state as a whole, but rather 
promoting more specific ideas and policies that will not be subject to a wide range of 
interpretations.   
 The final component of Cull’s taxonomy is international broadcasting.  This 
component makes use of international media such as radio, television and the Internet 
to engage and inform an international audience (Cull, 2008: 34).  One of the most 
analysed cases of public diplomacy through international broadcasting is the United 
States’ broadcast of ‘Al Hurra’, a television news station intended to “provide 
objective, accurate, and relevant news and information to the people of the Middle East 
about the region, the world and the United States” (Al Hurra, 2005).  This particular 
case has been widely considered a failure of cross-cultural communication2, and 
highlights one of the major risks of government-sponsored international broadcasting, 
namely that the message will be seen by its audience as propaganda. 
 Altogether these components can be used to promote a positive image of a state 
to a foreign audience.  Ideally, relevant stakeholders would coordinate all of these 
elements to achieve a specific goal, such as support for a foreign policy or peace 
between countries.  Of course, this is rarely the case, given the number of organisations                                                         2 Ayesha (2008: 100) actually links the station to the erosion of the American image in 
the Arab world—a level of failure beyond merely failing to meet objectives.    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and individuals involved in creating soft power, both from within the government and 
outside of it.  While efforts are often fragmented, many organisations do attempt to 
develop soft power in the hopes of political or economic gain. These efforts are 
generally identified as ‘public diplomacy’. 
 
Public Diplomacy 
 
 Defining public diplomacy—articulating what it is and how to approach it—
may be one of the more contentious activities within the social sciences.  Conceptions 
of public diplomacy have evolved over time, and vary among professional fields, with 
definitions casting public diplomacy as anything from modern propaganda to 
international journalism to large-scale public relations to a branch of traditional 
diplomacy.  Though the main dimensions of public diplomacy are easy to identify and 
understand, the lack of an accepted definition limits the ability of researchers and 
practitioners.   
 For instance, some see public diplomacy as a branch of traditional diplomacy, 
orchestrated by the state in the interest of forwarding foreign policy interests, albeit a 
branch making use of non-traditional tools: 
Public diplomacy refers to government-sponsored programs intended to inform or influence public 
opinion in other countries; its chief instruments are publications, motion pictures, cultural exchanges, 
radio and television.  (U.S. Department of State 1987, cited in Waller 2007:24). 
 
...A government’s process of communicating with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about 
understanding for its nation’s ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals 
and policies. (Hans Tuch, 1990, cited in Melissen, 2005: 11-2) 
 
 Alternatively, it has been defined not as a tool to promote certain foreign 
policies directly, but rather as a subtler means to garner support for these policies 
through first gaining general support for a nation’s culture and societal values: 
Public diplomacy seeks through the exchange of people and ideas to build lasting relationships and 
receptivity to a nation’s culture, values, and policies.   (Defense Science Board 2007, cited in Waller, 
2007:33).
  15 
 
 
 Others, often those who come from a background in public relations, see 
parallels between public diplomacy and marketing.  These parallels lead some to 
define public diplomacy as a particular type of marketing campaign: 
Public diplomacy includes interpersonal debate and negotiation between professional diplomats ranging 
from international treaties, reparations, commercial and trade agreements, economic and development 
aid, and ecological practices to framework agreements for educational and cultural exchanges.  All 
entail a range of promotional and persuasive strategies and techniques in addition to media relations. 
(L’Etang, 2009: 610) 
 
The principles of persuasive communication hold true whether you find yourself in the world of 
marketing or foreign affairs.  There is a discipline we learned in marketing every kind of product and 
service that does apply to the presenting of American values and policies... (Charlotte Beers 2002, cited 
in Waller, 2007: 31) 
 
 Another approach is to view public diplomacy through the lens of 
communications theory.  Public diplomacy strategies thereby become a facet of 
strategic communication, used by governments to communicate outside of official 
channels: 
Practitioners and scholars agree public diplomacy involves a government’s communications beyond its 
borders outside of state-to-state channels.  However, differences arise in the role of public diplomacy in 
foreign policy making. (Frensley and Michaud, 2006: 202) 
 
  
 While each definition offers a useful way to viewing public diplomacy, each 
definition remains incomplete.  Looking at public diplomacy as the deliberate actions 
of the state, misses the effect of non-state actors identified by those approaching the 
field with a public relations or communications framework.  In this age of lightening-
fast communications technology, the opportunity to access and share information and 
opinions allows any number of actors to participate in policy debates and 
implementation (Riordan, 2005: 190).   These actors can include independent media, 
business, educators, students, NGOs, advocacy groups or even an individual with a 
Twitter account.  Without considering these actors, polls measuring public opinion to 
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gauge the success of public diplomacy campaigns will not be able to point to the cause 
of success or failure. 
 To take the approach of public diplomacy as a new spin on public relations is to 
miss the importance of the policies and power relations driving the campaign.  Further, 
a marketing approach may simply be too reductive for the purposes of developing soft 
power.  To promote a country as one would a product or a brand, one must reduce it to 
an appealing and easily articulated identity (Melissen, 2005: 20).  But by doing so one 
loses the dynamism that makes a country appealing in the first place.  As Riordan 
(2005: 188) explains: “The strength of a country’s image emerges from its cultural, 
political and economic plurality.  Attempting to impose an artificial coherence, and to 
spin it to the rest of the world in the way that policy-makers or their consultants think 
profitable, risks undermining both richness and credibility.”   
 Adding tot he confusion, there has been little progress made in the objective 
evaluation of success in public diplomacy.  Evaluation is defined by measuring 
achievement against intent, and yet it is surprisingly rare for a public diplomacy 
campaign to launch with any sort of measurable goal in mind.  For instance, Al Hurra, 
an American international broadcasting effort towards the Arab world, launched in 
2004 with the objectives of enhancing the quality of Arab news and fostering an 
engaged Arab public (Powers and El Gody, 2009: 51).  Vague goals such as these are 
common, but measuring the growing ‘strength of mutual understanding’ would be a 
feat far beyond the statistical abilities of most researchers.  Rather, the goals of a 
public diplomacy campaign need to be concrete and measureable. 
 Even with concrete goals, there is the issue of a public diplomat’s capacity to 
measure success.  Polls and focus groups can be used to measure changing opinion, but 
these results may be subject to what is known among physicists as the observer effect.  
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This refers to observation that measurement of certain systems changes their outcome, 
rendering them impossible to ever accurately measure.  In some cases, public 
diplomacy may suffer from the observer effect.  For instance, while it is possible to set 
a measurable goal for a public diplomacy campaign (such as an improvement in public 
opinion of a country), actually evaluating a programme would require thorough 
surveys of participants both before and after the campaign.  This may make the 
political intentions of it explicit, and would likely negate any goodwill the project had 
achieved (Scott-Smith, 2009: 179).  Without any tools to measure the effect of the 
public diplomacy effort it is impossible to know for sure whether or not the 
programme was successful. 
 Without a single, widely accepted definition of public diplomacy or method for 
measuring its success, its effects and best practises are up for debate.  Perhaps the most 
graceful solution is to accept that this truly is an interdisciplinary field, and to apply 
the relevant theories to the components of public diplomacy.  Through micro-level 
analysis, a clearer picture of the whole can emerge. 
 
Communications Approach  
 Both international broadcasting and advocacy can be examined through the 
lens of communications theory.  Through these practices, public diplomacy messages 
may be passed from a government’s leadership to a foreign public.  This typically 
occurs through a process that can be visualised through Entman’s (2008: 98) cascading 
activation model (see below), first suggested as a model for domestic media framing 
and later adapted to a public diplomacy context.  The importance of this model lies in 
its explication of exactly how a media message transfers from its source to its 
audience, and the multiple filters it must pass through. 
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Cascading Network Activation (Entman, 2008: 98) 
 Just as in a real waterfall, the messages that start from the top have the most 
power as they make their way down, and are the easiest to disseminate (Entman, 2003: 
420).  With each level of the model, a message is adapted and adjusted to fit the 
agenda of the actors whose responsibility is to pass it down to the next level.  Entman 
(2003: 421) explains that as a story moves down the levels, “the flow of information 
becomes less and less thorough, and increasingly limited to the selected highlights, 
processed through schemas, and then passed on in an ever-cruder form.”  This process 
chisels down an event or issue until it is a simple and easily understandable message. 
 To direct the importance and focus of the messages within the cascading 
activation model, message-makers can make use of two tools known as agenda setting 
and framing.  Agenda setting (also called priming) reflects the idea that by giving 
certain stories more coverage than other stories, the media is able to influence public 
opinion regarding the salience of issues (McCombs, 2004: 1).  This technique is 
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particularly useful with international issues—such as those addressed with public 
diplomacy—when the general public has little or no firsthand knowledge of the issue 
(Iyengar and McGrady, 2007: 210).  Agenda setting has also been found to be most 
effective when the topics being addressed have personal or societal relevance to the 
audience (McCombs, 2004: 54)—though research indicates that this is not as effective 
as framing when it comes to affecting attitudes towards foreign countries (Brewer, 
Graf and Willnat, 2003).   
 Framing is a tool used by the media to affect public opinion.  While agenda 
setting tells the audience what to think about, framing tells the audience how to think 
about it (Iyengar and McGrady, 2007: 220).   Entman (2009: 5) offers a similar, but 
expanded, definition of framing: “selecting and highlighting some facets of events or 
issues, and making connections among them so as to promote a particular 
interpretation, evaluation and/or solution”.  Kellstedt (2005: 168) explains that 
“Frames help us to make mental connections between things we already know and 
believe and the things we’re just learning”.  It is framing that allows public diplomats 
to present the details of an event or issue that make them important to foreign policy, 
and to select certain details over others in order to promote particular interpretations of 
the foreign issue. 
 Entman (2004: 417) provides four distinct functions of framing in the media: 
defining effects or conditions as problematic, identifying causes; conveying moral 
judgment of those involved, and endorsing remedies or improvements to the 
problematic situation.  The two most important functions, he explains, are the 
definition of the problem, which typically guides the rest of the frame, and the 
proposed solution, which can recommend support or opposition for policy (Entman, 
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2009: 6).  In regards to public diplomacy, the solution will be the area in which a 
foreign policy is prescribed.   
 The link between framing and public opinion was first developed by 
psychologists Kahneman and Tversky, who found that decision-making in the same 
scenarios changed among subjects based on the presentation of information (Scheufele 
and Tewksbury, 2007: 11).  It has since been well established that media framing 
affects public opinion, but it is less clear where frames originate and why certain 
frames gain popularity over other, competing frames.  Most events and issues can be 
understood from a number of perspectives and, in fact, the public is almost always 
exposed to competing frames.  In a study of 14 different newsworthy issues, Chong 
and Druckman (n.d., cited in Druckman, 2010: 102) find that American, mainstream 
media presents an average of 5.09 frames per issue.   
 
How Frames are Developed 
 
 Political frames are conceived through interactions between journalists, elites 
and the public.  When an issue emerges as important through agenda setting, 
journalists typically begin research by listening to elites—via press conferences, press 
releases or interviews.  Frames represent their particular interpretation of the facts of 
an event or an issue, and the development of conflicting frames is typically reflective 
of a battle for political legitimacy among local elites and challengers (Wolfsfeld, 
1997).  The indexing hypothesis indicates that the elites have a very strong influence 
over the shape of the debate as it is presented by the media.  In his case study of New 
York Times coverage of American policy making on Nicaragua in the mid 1980’s, 
Bennett (1990: 120) demonstrates that mainstream media closely follows the debate as 
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it is structured by elites, rather than voicing the opinions reflected by polls of the 
general public.  Hallin (1994: 52) corroborates this theory with a study on American 
coverage of the Vietnam War, where he found the oppositional voices to be entirely 
within the parameters of elite debate.  
 Some argue with these theories, and point to oppositional voices outside of elite 
debate that have been found in other studies of international news framing.  For 
instance, Althaus’s (2003: 404) work on the coverage of the Persian Gulf crisis.  In this 
study, it was determined that elite voices are not the only source of framing, and that 
journalists often make an effort to find and present oppositional frames.  Wolfsfeld 
(1997: 16-20) suggests that political or social status, strong organisation and 
newsworthy behaviour may help a challenger’s frame gain traction with the media.  
Understanding the relationship between elite indexing and the inclusion of 
oppositional frames could be of help to a public diplomat seeking to be heard, either 
through the influence of local elites or as an external, oppositional voice. 
 Further complicating the issue of frame source in public diplomacy is research 
finding that in certain public diplomacy communications, specifically in international 
broadcasting, perceived distance from the government can improve the trustworthiness 
of the message (Cull, 2010: 13).  This can be problematic for countries with a tightly 
controlled press.  States like China have struggled with public diplomacy campaigns 
specifically because of a rigidly centralised and controlled government and censored 
media (d’Hooge, 2005: 102).  Typically, government agencies are the least trusted as 
producers of media messages, and media outlets seen as close to the government are 
considered unreliable (Cull, 2008: 34-5).  This was possibly one of the greatest reasons 
for Al Hurra’s failing as a tool of public diplomacy: over the course of its first 
weekend on-air, the network ran repeats of an exclusive interview with then-president 
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George W. Bush, “drawing attention to Al Hurra’s ties to the American government 
and setting a strong propagandistic tone” (Powers and El Gody, 2009: 52).  These 
networks will also be subject to scrutiny at home if they attempt to be credible by 
promoting a message that strays from the accepted message at home.   
 In addition to elites and their challengers, structural factors may determine the 
range of frames reflected in the news media.  Entman (2009: 14) writes that “News 
organisations and personnel are driven by economic pressure and incentives; 
professional customs, norms and principles; and normative values”.  Economic 
pressures include the need to attract a large audience, which may cause journalists to 
adopt frames that are persuasive to a wide audience.  In accordance with professional 
customs and norms, journalists may favour frames that are objective, simple and 
timely—regardless of what is politically popular (though it is worth noting that local 
elites are often a journalist’s most reliable and inexpensive source for information 
considered credible (Mermin, 1999: 18)).  Additionally, journalists may look at the 
issue laterally, examining competitors’ coverage and talking to other journalists 
(Entman, 2009: 9), thus consolidating the use of popular frames.  Challengers to elite 
framing may also have some success if capitalising on existing frames and current 
political conditions (Wolfsfeld, 1997: 55).  In stories about international issues, 
messages could also originate from some of the public diplomacy tools categorised by 
Cull (2008): advocacy from diplomats and embassy press releases or through 
international broadcasting.  
  The problems of a credible source and relevant presentation can be surmounted 
by using public diplomacy tools to influence the mainstream media of a foreign 
country.  If a frame is adopted by the local mainstream media it is less likely to be 
viewed negatively as propaganda.  Entman (2009: 153) offers another possibility: 
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“Even if foreign sources themselves enjoy scant credibility with most Americans, 
overseas opposition—more accessible than ever because of the internet—may 
stimulate more independent counter-framing by journalists, and that can reinforce 
dissent among U.S. citizens.”   
 
What Makes a Frame Successful?  
 Due to economic constraints on news producers, it is impossible for all possible 
frames describing an issue or event to be adopted by the media.  Rather, journalists 
will select certain frames that they expect will best resonate with their audience.  
Chong and Druckman (2007) measured the effect of strong frames (frames that are 
compelling and persuasive to the audience) against the effect of weak frames (frames 
that are unpersuasive) and found that strong frames have significantly more success 
than weak frames in affecting audience opinion.  Not only are strong frames successful 
on their own, but this same study also found that weak frames can actually push public 
opinion towards opposing frames. 
 One characteristic attributed to strong frames is their availability to the 
audience.  To be persuasive, a frame must employ concepts that that audience 
understands (Chong and Druckman, 2007a: 639).  Chong and Druckman (2007b: 110) 
illustrate this by explaining that a person who did not understand the concept of free 
speech would be unmoved by frames promoting the right to free speech.  The simpler a 
concept, the more likely is it to be seen as available by the audience.  Frames that are 
available to an audience are also available to the nation’s journalists.  Journalists 
therefore maintain a repertoire of established frame structures that will recur in their 
presentation of issues and events and will be selected from as a way to interpret new 
events and information (Wolfsfeld, 1997: 54, Johnson-Cartee, 2005: 159). 
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 A strong frame is also used repeatedly, so that audience members think about it 
often.  Chong and Druckman (2007a: 639) refer to this as the accessibility of the 
frame, and explain that “The accessibility of a consideration increases with its chronic 
use; therefore politically knowledgeable people who often think about political issues 
have more accessible considerations”.  Put simply, if the ideas presented are not 
familiar to the audience, they are unlikely to be adopted.  In this sense, repetition of a 
frame becomes a factor of its strength.   
 Accessibility and availability allow the audience to form an opinion without 
conscious deliberation, and may be more effective when there is minimal competition 
between frames.  In competitive contexts, frames are strongest when they are 
consistent with the existing attitudes of the audience, characteristic that can be thought 
of as applicability (Chong and Druckman, 2007a: 639).  Iyengar and McGrady (2007: 
225) find that framing is considered most effective when the message reinforces a held 
belief of the individual.  Different audience members will understand and engage with 
the same media messages in completely different ways, a discrepancy that can be 
attributed to processing these messages through a filter of first-hand experiences and 
prior media exposure (Traudt, 2005: 11).   
 Entman (2003: 417) agrees that previous attitudes and experiences are 
important, writing that the most influential framing will apply words and images that 
are recognisable and understandable to the audience.  He illustrates this idea with the 
example of American media framing after the terrorist attacks of 9/11.  He points out 
that in some parts of the world those responsible for the attacks were not framed as 
terrorist but rather as “freedom fighters” opposing an imperial force.  The American 
audience largely rejected this frame in part because the concept of the United States as 
an imperial force was immediately new and offensive while the idea of “Islamic 
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fanatics targeting innocent civilians” was already familiar (2004: 16).  One way a 
frame becomes accessible is through repeated exposure to the idea (Chong and 
Druckman, 2007b: 110).   
 The qualities that make a frame culturally congruent can be difficult to identify 
and generalise to be useful in practice.  Previous studies indicate that a good starting 
point is the lack of support among the media for frames that challenge the legitimacy 
of their home country.   Entman (2004: 154-155) explains that during the build-up to 
the Iraq War in 2003, the American media gave little attention to the United States’ 
role in supporting Saddam Hussein in the 1980s, and of Iraq’s development of 
weapons of mass destruction.  Entman suggests that these frames were ignored because 
such a record “put the United States in the awkward position of itself being a nation 
with a record of supporting terrorism”.  Althaus (2003: 396) also finds that while 
foreign sources do appear often to support oppositional frames, “but only using those 
themes that left the legitimacy of the American actors and motives unquestioned and 
that resonated with the cultural values of American audiences.”  
 Perhaps then, a sign of cultural incongruence can be thought of as a challenge 
to a country’s political legitimacy.  Beetham (1991: 16) suggests that the legitimacy of 
an actor can be identified through the presence of three qualities:  
I. It conforms to established rules 
II. The rules can be justified by reference to beliefs shared by both dominant and 
subordinate, and 
III. There is evidence of consent by the subordinate to the particular power relation. 
 This definition offers clear framework through which to evaluate the possibility 
that, as suggested, challenges to a state’s legitimacy are largely avoided by that 
country’s mainstream media.  For instance, when applying this definition to existing 
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research, there are very few studies that identify cases in which the media appears to 
challenge local legitimacy, even in cases in which the established rules have clearly 
been broken.  For instance, Rowling et al. (2011: 1057) finds that during the Abu 
Ghraib torture scandal, in which the United States’ government was implicated in the 
torture of Iraqi prisoners, the press largely presented frames that protected both the 
country’s positive self-identity and the legitimacy of its government.  Additionally, 
Jones and Sheets’ (2009) study shows that American journalists were less challenging 
to American legitimacy over this issue (measured through use of the word ‘torture’ to 
describe the Abu Ghraib incident) than the journalists of any other country in the study 
(Australia, England, Canada, Italy, Germany and Spain).    
 One case study that does find a country’s media challenging their government’s 
legitimacy is Livingston and Eachus’ (1996) work on American media coverage of 
paramilitary organisations in Central America.  In this work, the media explicitly 
linked the United States government to death squads in Guatemala, challenging both 
the American government’s legitimacy and morality in their role in Central America.  
However, this case study appears to be the exception rather than the rule—there are 
few other examples of this and, as will be addressed in the final chapter, there are a 
few unique variables in this case study that may have resulted in Livingston and 
Eachus’ unique findings.   
 In the most case studies that make up the body of research around international 
issues framing, frames have not been directly challenging to local legitimacy (see 
Hallin 1989, Mermin, 1999, Entman, 2003, Althaus, 2003).  Possibly, such framing 
would conflict with the norms and values of the audience, which would make them 
unlikely to be used in the media.  Entman (2003: 423) describes a ‘tipping point’ at 
which a message will seem so far outside of the realm of availability, accessibility and 
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applicability that it will simply be ignored, and illustrates this with the continuum on 
the following page (Entman, 2008: 93).  Hallin (1989: 117) identifies a similar trend in 
his work on televised stories of the Vietnam War, and describes three spheres that are 
governed by different journalistic standards: the Sphere of Legitimate Controversy, 
where stories comprise the objective repetition of facts; the Sphere of Consensus, 
which involves subjects whose values society largely agrees upon, allowing the 
reporter to advocate the existing values of the consensus; and the Sphere of Deviance, 
where viewpoints that contradict or challenge the status quo sit, going unreported by 
the mainstream media. The specifics of what belongs in each sphere is largely 
culturally relative, and messages from the Sphere of Consensus in one culture may 
very well find itself in the Sphere of Deviance in another. 
 For instance, viewers of Al Hurra in Iraq find the channel untrustworthy—far 
more than viewers from any other Arab nation.  This is possibly because the messages 
promoted by Al Hurra are not consistent with the unique experiences of the Iraqi 
people (Powers and El Gody, 2009: 59); a discrepancy between experience and media 
content that results in failed public diplomacy.  In fact, the George W. Bush speech 
that many feel made the stations ties to the American government too explicit may not 
have been so ruinous if the content of the speech—justification of American soldiers 
using torture techniques in Iraqi prisons—had not been so inapplicable to Iraqi public 
opinion (Hafez, 2007: 121).  This case serves to point out the importance of 
understanding the culture and beliefs of the target audience and honing messages 
appropriately. 
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Cultural congruence key to elite, media and public responses (Entman, 2008: 93) 
 
 Multiple studies on frame types used in international issues have found that 
conflict and responsibility frames are strong across a range of countries (Semetko and 
Valkenburg, 2000; Camaj, 2010).  A conflict frame emphasises a disagreement or 
tension between two parties as the main problem, and responsibility framing is 
characterised by its clear attribution of responsibility for the problem through assigning 
blame and/or specifying an actor who is accountable for resolving the issue (Semetko 
and Valkenburg, 2000: 95-96).  These two frame types are found frequently in 
international issues framing, which may be due to their fulfilment of two functions of 
framing: identifying the cause of the problem and suggesting a solution (Entman, 
2004: 417).  Additionally, the responsibility frame structure implies a clear protagonist 
and antagonist, an important element in storytelling (Cook, 1996: 477).  The simple 
dichotomy presented by conflict and responsibility frames could also make them 
appealing to journalists.  Althaus et al. (1996: 416) found that mainstream media 
coverage of internal, American political debate was typically boiled down to a 
dichotomy of opinion rather than a rich and multi-faceted conversation.  This type of 
storytelling is consistent with sensationalist news values pushing for drama and 
simplicity (Wolfsfeld, 2004: 40), and fits easily into conflict and responsibility frame 
types.   
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 Also evaluated in these studies are consequence frames, which emphasise the 
effect of the issue or event rather than the cause or solution.  For instance, an issue or 
event may have ramifications for human well-being, economics or the security of a 
country.  These frames have not been found to be as prevalent in explaining 
international issues, and have also been found to vary in use among issues and media 
outlets (Semetko and Valkenburg, 2000: 107; Camaj, 2010: 646).  In none of these 
case studies were consequence frames used similarly by different countries for the 
same issue.  Work by Kolmer and Semetko (2009) suggests that use of consequence 
frames may be linked to the political context of the media outlet’s home country.  In a 
study of American, English, Czech, South African, German and Middle Eastern 
framing of the Iraq War, it was found that the journalists from countries that opposed 
the war emphasised political consequences more often than the American or English 
media (2009: 653).   
 Alternatively, this could be reflective of levels of sensationalism in the local 
media.  Sensationalism can be thought of as the prioritisation of emotional or dramatic 
news frames, over those that may be more informational or balanced.  These frames 
tend to emphasise immediacy, drama, simplicity and ethnocentrism (Wolfsfeld, 2004: 
40) as well as which favours “exaggeration and emotionalism” (Cooper, 2005: 127)—
—factors that fit well with most consequence framing.  Human consequence frames, 
especially, have been used by sensational media as a simple and emotional way of 
explaining the direct effect of an issue on other people.  In a longitudinal study, 
Patterson (2000: 4) found that frequency of human consequence frames more than 
doubled between 1980 and 2000, correlating to a 15% point increase in stories with 
moderate to high levels of sensationalism.  Foreign news producers may be able to 
capitalise on high levels of sensationalism in the media, and introduce frames that are 
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interesting enough to stimulate inclusion in media coverage.  As Wolfsfeld (1997: 22) 
explains, “The first obligation of any journalist is to produce a “good story” and when 
challengers provide better stories than authorities, they get more—though not 
necessarily better—coverage.”   
  
Framing in International Communications 
 
 The same frames cannot be expected to affect audiences equally around the 
world.  Past experiences and information play a major role in frame development, and 
it follows that much of this learning is a factor of the cultural background of the 
audience (Tannen, 1993: 15).  The political and economic culture within each state is 
likely to foster the development of specific frames used often to describe certain 
political issues and create an ‘issue culture’.  An issue culture is a collection of idea 
elements that are “grouped together into more or less harmonious clusters or 
interpretive packages” and used to describe an issue (Gamson and Lasch, 1983: 398, 
cited in Johnson-Cartee, 2005: 166).  For instance, an issue culture around welfare 
policy may include packages describing ‘welfare freeloaders’, ‘working poor’, 
‘poverty trap’ and ‘regulating the poor’ (Gamson and Lasch, 1983: 410-411, cited in 
Johnson-Cartee, 2005: 166).  These clusters represent different, repeated 
interpretations of the same issue that ultimately become understood tropes representing 
particular ideas, attitudes and values. 
 Identifying those frames belonging to a nation’s issue culture allows for a 
better understanding of the parameters of debate within the country.  Every system 
places its own constraints and liberties on its news outlets, and as Hachten and Scotton 
(2007: 17) point out: “all press systems reflect the values of the political and economic 
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systems of the nations from within which they operate”.  The American model of 
news, for example, appears objective and independent to Westerners (Tunstall, 1977: 
24) and is provided to the consumer by elites (Sarikakas, 2005:83).  This system also 
operates under the tenet that the government should not interfere with the messages of 
the press (Hachten and Scotton, 2007: 20).   
 The United States’ media model is also largely driven by the profit motive, 
resulting in an abundance of entertainment programming paid for by advertisements 
(McChesney, 1999: 229).  The commercialisation of media does not simply represent 
the addition of advertisement to existing programming, but rather speaks to a unique 
character of the media.  Advertising space is more valuable when more potential 
consumers are exposed to it, resulting in an intent focus on entertaining and attention-
grabbing, sensationalised media content.  In this system, media content that entertains 
rather than informs is justified as being dictated by the tastes of the consumers (Curran, 
2002: 197).  According to Wolfsfeld (2004: 40), these journalistic norms result in news 
values that “place a high value on emotionalism rather than reason, on entertainment 
rather than information.   
 Influencing these media systems is a homogenising process known as 
globalisation.  Globalisation has no agreed upon definition, though for the purpose of 
this paper it will be understood as “a social process in which the constraints of 
geography on social and cultural arrangements recede and in which people become 
increasingly aware that they are receding” (Waters, 1995: 3).  One might further 
elaborate that these ‘arrangements’ include economic, political and cultural systems.  
The merits and effects of this ‘social process’ are widely debated.  Some see 
globalisation as representative of the spread of neo-liberal ideology and cultural 
homogenisation, while others see it as the natural expansion of communication 
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technology.  Through either perspective, it is clear that globalisation reflects the 
propagation of interconnectedness across the world and the increased redundancy of 
political borders. 
 The American system of private media ownership is a good fit to the neo-
liberal economic system, and therefore to globalisation.  Businesses in all industries 
benefit from advertising revenue and as markets expand and competition increases, 
commercial media becomes necessary.  The Swiss government, for instance, was 
pressured to adopt commercial media by local manufacturers who were competing 
with Italian and German businesses whose commercials were shown on transmissions 
that could be picked up in Switzerland (Schiller, 1995: 198).  In fact, globalisation has 
resulted in pressure to deregulate the national media in many countries in the world 
(McChesney, 2008: 245), particularly Western countries. 
 However, not all countries have adopted this system, and some, such as 
Vietnam, maintain a news media system controlled by the government.  Rantanen 
(1998: 127) identifies three functions of government-owned news outlets: first, as way 
for the government to spread information it deemed important; second, as a filter for 
news received from abroad; and third, as a way to disseminate a positive image of the 
government.  Framing from this system can be expected to strongly reflect the views of 
the government and to lack oppositional framing.  
 China’s media is an interesting synthesis of the capitalist model and communist 
government oversight.  In many respects, Chinese media shares the for-profit 
characteristics that define the American media.  For instance, Chinese media is 
designed to appeal to wide audiences as strives to attract advertisers (Tunstall, 2008: 
191, Hachten and Scotton, 2007: 95).  However, the government maintains strict 
control over the content of the media, censoring anything that might be seen as 
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threatening to those in power (Hachten and Scotton, 2007: 94).  Frames from this type 
of media system can be expected to reflect the elite voices and lack oppositional 
framing, but will also demonstrate some of the same frames that make privately-owned 
media attractive and engaging to an audience. 
 These disparate cultures and political systems result in audiences trained to 
expect and interpret frames differently, and a frame that works in one country cannot 
be expected to work in another.  As the United States learned in the case of Al Hurra 
however, there is more to this process than simply broadcasting an idea and waiting for 
the local audience to adopt it.  Referring back to Hallin’s (1989) Spheres, we can look 
at the Sphere of Consensus as a representative of cultural values (encompassing “social 
objects not regarded by journalists and most of the society as controversial” (1986: 
116) and the Sphere of Legitimate Controversy as a proxy for political culture 
(encompassing “issues recognised as such by the major established actors of the 
American political process” (1986: 116)).  Through this visualisation, the importance 
of framing an issue within the boundaries of a country’s political culture are apparent.   
 
Spheres of Consensus, Legitimate Controversy and Deviance (Hallin,1989: 116) 
 
 Clearly, the existing beliefs and habits of journalists in any country come into 
play when it comes to foreign frame adoption.  A study on American foreign policy 
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framing in Canadian media found that rather than operating as transmitters of a foreign 
government’s advocacy, journalists will process information and present it in a way 
that is consistent with their beliefs (Frensly and Michaud, 2006).  In public diplomacy, 
it therefore behoves messengers to frame issues in a way that will resonate with the 
intended audience while still promoting the ideas and values behind proposed policy.  
This should improve the frame’s likelihood of becoming incorporated by the local 
audience, as represented by the cascading activation model.  Once a frame has become 
a part of the dynamics highlighted by the cascading activation model, it improves the 
chances that the frame will influence local media and audiences—the ultimate goal of 
public diplomacy.   
 
Research Question and Hypotheses 
 This thesis seeks to better understand the use of news framing and how framing 
might be used in public diplomacy.  Rather than evaluating a public diplomacy 
campaign, this research will examine the stories that are used and understood in the 
news media across different countries.  Through the findings from this study, the 
messages transmitted through advocacy and international broadcasting can hopefully 
be understood to better communicate with a foreign audience.  This study attempts to 
investigate and answers the central question:   
 
• Research Question: What news frames from foreign sources are most likely to 
be adopted by local media and audiences?   
 
 In order to address this question, this thesis compares news coverage of three 
countries covering four international issues to determine what is being said, how it is 
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being said and who is saying it in each country involved.  By understanding these 
elements of news stories, the types of frames that are most available, accessible and 
applicable to the target media and audience can be identified.  If a public diplomacy 
message hopes to enter the local framing competition, as per the cascading activation 
model (Entman, 2008: 98) described in the literature review, then it may benefit from 
adopting some of these characteristics that this study uncovers.   
 The research question is informed by testing three hypotheses.  The first 
hypothesis seeks to identify frame structures that are commonly used across cultures.  
These structures (also called ‘scripts) imply a “particular type of story, one that 
journalists frequently produce by following habitual information processing routines 
when confronted by certain types of situations” (Entman, 2004: 26).  While a frame 
may identify the problem, cause and solution to the issue, a frame structure indicates 
the contextual relevance of the issue.  For instance, some actors may be interested in 
the human consequences aspect of an issue, say human rights in China, while others 
may be more concerned with the economic ramifications of imposing sanctions to 
punish human rights abusers.  Still others may be more concerned with political 
tensions between China and the West over the issue.  The frame structures favoured by 
a nation’s media should be reflective of the audience’s concerns. 
 The benefit of identifying similarities in frame structures used across countries 
is in the potential for understanding how journalists in different countries interpret 
information about international issues regardless of political and cultural differences.  
Similarities in frame structure indicate that there may be overlap in the information 
processing routines of journalists across countries.  Conversely, findings of frame 
structures not used across countries can indicate that the frame structure is not 
available, or at least not contextually applicable, in certain countries.  Identifying such 
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frames will hopefully move scholarship closer to an understanding of what frames can 
be used successfully in international communication.  The first hypothesis will 
therefore seek to identify use of frame structures: 
 
• Hypothesis 1: (a) Conflict and responsibility frame structures will be equally 
adopted across many countries. (b) Consequence frame types will be less 
popular and used varyingly across countries. 
  
 The first part of this hypothesis is concerned with conflict frames, which 
emphasise a disagreement or tension between two parties as the main problem 
(Semetko and Valkenburg, 2000: 95), and responsibility frames, which are 
characterised by clear attribution of responsibility for the problem through assigning 
blame and/or specifying an actor who is accountable for resolving the issue (Semetko 
and Valkenburg, 2000: 96).  That conflict frames will be widespread is an idea based 
on the work of Neuman et al. (1992: 61-62), who found that conflict frames were 
commonly used by American media covering a variety of issues.  Patterson (1993) 
likewise found conflict frames were common in American presidential election 
campaign news, while Karlberg (1997) found conflict frames were prevalent when 
describing environmental issues.  These studies indicate that the conflict frame 
structure is not isolated to military conflicts.   
 Nor does it appear isolated to American news: Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) 
and Camaj (2010) found conflict and responsibility frame types to be favoured by 
media outlets from different European countries when framing international issues.   
The other frame types in these studies, which focus on the consequences of an issue 
rather than fault or solution, were found to vary across issues and countries (Semetko 
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and Valkenburg, 2000).  These earlier studies evaluated media framing in European 
countries.  In this study, it will be seen if these trends are also prevalent in China and 
Vietnam.  If the hypothesis is supported by evidence from these cases then it can be 
assumed that the findings have the potential to be generalised across countries in 
different regions, given the culturally and politically dissimilar contexts in which they 
are found. 
   While a shared frame structure may point to similarities in the way journalists 
commonly process and present information, it does not imply that a frame will 
resonate with a foreign audience.  Even within the same frame structure or script, there 
are many ways for journalists to present the story.  Similarities or differences in the 
content of frames, therefore, are a necessary area of study.  Mermin (1999: 13) 
suggests that foreign frames may often be too unfamiliar to be adopted: “Foreign 
critics, as a rule, do not phrase arguments in terms that speak to American interests or 
concerns and often argue in ways that are bound to strike Americans as outrageous, 
irrational, or simply bizarre.”  This is especially relevant when the legitimacy of the 
media outlet’s home country is challenged by foreign framing, as audiences tend to be 
nationalistic and ethnocentric in their framing of foreign affairs (Wolfsfeld, 2004: 22-
23).  The next hypothesis tests this idea:  
 
• Hypothesis 2:  Stories challenging an audience country’s legitimacy will be 
ignored, marginalised or challenged by the local media. 
  
 This hypothesis follows Wolfsfeld’s (1997: 52-54) suggestion that framing 
contests are largely defined by a struggle for legitimacy between the authorities and the 
challengers.  In these cases, covering the messages of challengers does not conflict 
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with the legitimacy of the media outlet’s home country.  Additionally, the works of 
Hallin (1989), Entman (2004) and Chong and Druckman (2007), indicate that it is 
unlikely for a frame to be found across cultures if it alienates one of the societies 
involved because, as Wolfsfeld (2004) argues, media coverage of foreign affairs tends 
to be ethnocentric and nationalistic.  It is assumed therefore, that when the framing 
contest takes the form of two countries challenging each other’s legitimacy (as per 
Beetham’s (1991) definition of the word as conforming to rules established and 
accepted by both the dominant and subordinate groups), the media will maintain the 
legitimacy of its home country.  Testing this hypothesis will draw from Wolfsfeld’s 
research and identify any cases in which challengers to local legitimacy gain traction 
within the local media.  This information will help answer the research question by 
identifying whether or not a challenge to the state’s legitimacy limits the effectiveness 
of a public diplomacy message.   
 The third hypothesis seeks to identify the extent to which journalists will 
present frames outside the parameters of elite debate.  By understanding the influence 
of local elites on the media, this research will be able to identify the flexibility of 
American journalists in adopting frames from alternate sources, including foreign 
advocacy and international broadcasting. 
 Entman’s cascading activation model (2008: 98) indicates that dominant, 
international news frames can directly influence both a foreign nation’s media and 
their elites when the message is consistent with the audience’s culture.  Such as in 
Entman’s example of the ‘freedom fighter’ frame ignored by the American media after 
9/11.  Wolfsfeld (1997) and Althaus (2003: 405-6) also suggest that journalists are 
open to presenting oppositional voices when reporting on certain international events 
or issues, provided that the opposition has political or social status, strong organisation 
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and carries out exceptional behaviour (Wolfsfeld, 1997: 16-20).  However, Bennett 
(1990) and Hallin’s (1994) work indicates that media framing oppositional to the 
political elite only occurs when the opposition is within the parameters of elite 
discourse (for example, Bennett’s (1990: 118) findings that the American media 
closely reflected the political elite discourse on U.S. policy in Nicaragua, rather than 
reflecting American public opinion, which was largely wary of intervention).  An 
investigation of these arguments leads to the third hypothesis:   
 
• Hypothesis 3:  Journalists will be open to using foreign frames that deviate 
from local elite discourse. 
 
 This hypothesis seeks to test the extent to which the American media will use 
frames outside of the parameters of elite debate, and to suggest the most effective way 
for public diplomacy messages to influence foreign media.  If hypothesis 3 is 
supported by the findings, then it improves the likelihood that public diplomacy 
messages can be promoted through advocacy and international broadcasting.  If it 
proves false, then public diplomats may find more success by working with local elites 
to frame the issue. Through testing this hypothesis, this study hopes to further the 
understanding of whether an oppositional frame can gain traction within the local 
discourse as a foreign frame influencing local media, or if it must first influence elites.   
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2.  Methodology    
  To identify what foreign frames might be most likely to be adopted by a 
country’s media, this research uses case studies of four international issues framed by 
Chinese, Vietnamese and American media.  These states were chosen for a number of 
reasons.  First, they serve as examples of countries with strong cultural or political 
differences.  The particular direction of frames is often guided by political agendas 
(Entman, 2004), so although there may be cultural similarities between China and 
Vietnam3, the uneasy political relationships between the actors will likely result in 
dissimilar framing.  Second, this thesis addresses communication in the Asia-Pacific 
region.  Though important to the United States’ foreign policy interests, public 
diplomacy in this region has been researched significantly less than the Middle East.  
Third, most public diplomacy research regarding the United States has been on 
American attempts to influence foreign opinion.  This research evaluates media 
messaging coming from all three countries, something that may expand our 
understanding of international communication and mediated public diplomacy. 
 Four different issues were chosen as case studies, allowing each country to cast 
itself and the others in a variety of roles (such as aggressor, victim, saviour, and 
observer).  First, the case of a sovereignty dispute over the Spratly Islands is examined.  
This issue takes place in the South China Sea, where a number of Asian countries 
(including China and Vietnam) claim ownership over the string of oil-rich islands.                                                          3 While there are significant limitations in generalising something as complex as 
national culture, it is worth noting some of the similarities between China and Vietnam 
that Huntington (1996: 225) observes.  For instance, that China and Vietnam have 
millennia-old societies defined by “Asian values”, which are influenced by Buddhist 
and Confucian philosophies. 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Despite its distance from the islands, the United States has economic interest in who 
controls shipping rights to the area as well as political concern over the balance of 
power in East Asia.  This case provides an example of an issue where all three 
countries have different objectives, making it likely for elite framing to vary from 
country to country.  This offers a case study that will help answer the question of what 
frames are most likely to be adopted from foreign sources by pointing to similarities or 
differences in the way journalists of these countries process and present information on 
the same issue.   
 Second, the case of Agent Orange reparations is evaluated.  Agent Orange is a 
powerful defoliant used by the United States to remove forest cover from Viet Cong 
soldiers and to force urbanisation during the Vietnam War.  Decades later, the effects 
of this dioxin on human health and the environment are still felt in Vietnam.  This case 
study follows Vietnam’s request for reparations from the United States for damage 
caused.  The United States has already accepted responsibility for the problem and at 
this point, the dispute is over how much is owed.  This issue puts the United States and 
Vietnam at odds, offering examples of framing between two countries directly opposed 
on the issue, and will hopefully offer an example of how the American media responds 
to a challenge to the legitimacy of its former actions. 
 The decades-long timeframe of this issue also makes it unique for this type of 
study—most research on international news framing covers specific, short-term 
conflicts between countries.  The length of time lapsed between the initial conflict (the 
use of Agent Orange) and the effects being reported today may have an effect on the 
nature of the coverage. Additionally, this issue is not a military conflict and therefore 
will serve as a good test of whether or not conflict frame structures are used 
internationally to describe non-conflict issues, as suggested in hypothesis 1.  Though 
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this case does not include all three actors, the benefit of including a long-standing, 
non-military disagreement between countries outweighs the drawbacks of excluding 
China from this part of the analysis. 
 The third and fourth case studies focus on human rights issues in China and 
Vietnam respectively.  In both issues, American actors have criticised the human rights 
records of the Asian countries, while the Asian countries rebut the charges on the 
grounds that the United States is applying its own values to other cultures.  These two 
case studies are useful as examples of one of the most difficult problems faced by 
public diplomacy: how to influence a foreign public when culturally relative values are 
at the heart of the issue.  Additionally, the similarity between these case studies offers 
an opportunity to compare American elite and media framing of both issues.  Through 
this comparison, the level of influence elites have over the media framing of foreign 
policy issues can be evaluated, a finding that will be of particular relevance to 
hypothesis 3, and one that will address the research question by suggesting how 
sensitive American media is to the country’s international political relationships.  To 
evaluate these hypotheses, a two-tiered methodology has been created consisting of a 
quantitative content analysis and components of a qualitative discourse analysis. 
 
Content Analysis  
 In order to test the hypotheses in each of these case studies, content analysis 
will be used to identify frame structure in news stories as well as identifying the 
problem, cause and solution that make up the content of frames (Entman, 2004: 5).  By 
identifying how, when and in what format frames outside of local political elite 
discourse on foreign affairs enter the country’s media coverage, this research aims to 
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provide insights on the circumstances that may allow for more effective public 
diplomacy advocacy and international broadcasting. 
 Many studies on framing use a content analysis to identify frame structures in 
news stories (Gamson and Modigliani, 1989, Althaus et al., 1996, Semetko and 
Valkenburg, 2000; Fridkin and Kenney, 2005; Camaj, 2010).  The advantage of this 
approach is in its relative objectivity and reliability.  This type of empirical study is of 
particular importance in emerging fields, like public diplomacy, where replicable 
findings can be used to build theory and push forward new research and ideas 
(Tankard 2001, cited in Camaj 2010: 636).  In their 2000 study, Semetko and 
Valkenburg developed a coding sheet which suggests that all frames fall into one of 
the following structural categories: conflict, human interest, economic consequences, 
morality and responsibility.  This taxonomy was also used in Camaj’s study (2010) on 
international news coverage of Kosovo’s status negotiations.  These categories have 
largely been adopted in this study, and are used to guide the content analysis in its 
identification of frame structure in news stories. 
 Two adjustments have been made to Semetko and Valkenburg’s coding 
categories however—the ‘morality’ category that was used in previous research was 
omitted, and a new category called ‘security’ was added.  ‘Morality’ was not included 
as a frame structure category as the use of morality in these articles is being 
approached through the framing discourse analysis addresses moral judgements to 
some degree.  The identification of cause and solution also offer an assignment of 
blame—a framing function that explains which side is ‘right’ and therefore controlling 
the framing competition (Wolfsfeld, 1997: 54).  As the category is being refined and 
analysed in depth, it did not seem necessary to include it in the structural analysis.  The 
security frame structure is included because of its relevance to the case study regarding 
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the territory conflict over the Spratly Islands, and because of its relevance to an 
American audience post-9/11 (as the event brought questions of global security to the 
forefront of the public’s attention).  This category is similar to the ‘conflict’ category, 
though focuses on the military and geo-political consequences of the issue rather than 
the nature of the problem.  Through coding for this frame type, this thesis addresses the 
question of whether issues of security feature across cultures or if it is a strictly 
American preoccupation.     
 
Testing Hypothesis 1 
 
 The content analysis consists of a number of questions with between two and 
five multiple choice answers possible.  Each question in the content analysis represents 
a specific frame structure (conflict, responsibility, human consequence, economic 
consequence or security) and each positive answer is categorised as indicative of frame 
structure.  Some questions include multiple answers, qualifying the positive answers 
with details of the framing.  For the purpose of identifying frame structure, any of the 
qualifying ‘yes’ answers will be considered indicative of frame presence. 
 The results of the content analysis will offer data regarding the frame types 
favoured by each media outlet to describe each issue, demonstrating how media outlets 
in different countries present different international issues.  These findings will be used 
to test the first hypothesis, which posits that conflict and responsibility frame structures 
will be the two most common ways to explain an international issue.  The hypothesis 
also suggests that frames structures focusing on the consequences of the issue 
(analysed here as human consequence, economic consequence and security frame 
structures) will be used, though not with the same consistency and universality as 
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conflict and responsibility frame structures.  If this idea is supported, then it will be 
important to note which consequence frames were used, by which countries, and in 
which contexts.   
 Testing this hypothesis will help answer the research question by identifying 
what frame types are shared across cultures.  Knowledge about the frame structures 
that are employed by journalists in different countries will suggest their usefulness in 
public diplomacy communications.  If a frame structure is used widely in one country, 
but not at all in another, it follows that the journalists and audiences across these 
cultures have divergent information processing routines guiding their interpretation of 
the event.  In these cases, it is unlikely that a message from one country’s media will 
be available, accessible or applicable enough to be adopted by the other.  Through an 
understanding of the frame structures used internationally, this study will hopefully 
add to the body of knowledge regarding foreign frames that are most likely to be 
accepted across countries.  Understanding frame structure use across countries is the 
first level of analysis in this research.  A better understanding of how messages can be 
used successfully in public diplomacy will develop by addressing the content of these 
frames. 
   
Testing Hypothesis 2 
 
 In order to address the second hypothesis, multiple answer choices were 
provided for most questions.  These answers allow for further analysis using Entman’s 
functions of framing (problem, cause and solution (2003: 417)).  This allows the study 
to evaluate the problem, cause and solution identified by the media across the 
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countries.  This should allow for a replicable analysis of how the issue is characterised 
by the media.  Questions and answers for the framing categories are:  
 
Conflict  
 
Does this article reflect disagreement between 
parties/individuals/groups/governments? 
 1. Yes, disagreement between Chinese parties and American parties. 
 2.  Yes, disagreement between Vietnamese parties and American parties.   
 3.  Yes, disagreement between Chinese parties and Vietnamese parties. 
 4. Yes, other disagreement. 
 5 No disagreement. 
 
Does one party/individual/group/country express disapproval/disappointment of 
another? 
 1. Yes, disapproval of Chinese parties. 
 2.  Yes, disapproval of Vietnamese parties. 
 3. Yes, disapproval of American parties. 
 4. Yes, other disapproval. 
 5. No disapproval. 
 
Responsibility 
 
Does this article suggest that any individual, group or level of government (local or 
international) is to blame for the problem? 
 1.  Yes, Chinese party is to blame. 
 2. Yes, Vietnamese party is to blame. 
 3. Yes, American party is to blame. 
 4.  Yes, other. 
 5.  No blame assigned. 
 
Does the story mention a solution(s) to the problem? 
 1. Yes, issue can be resolved by China. 
 2. Yes, issue can be resolved by Vietnam. 
 3.  Yes, issue can be resolved by the United States. 
 4. Yes, other. 
 5.  No. 
 
Human Consequences 
 
Is the main focus of the article the effect of the issue on individuals or communities? 
 1. Yes, Chinese individuals/communities. 
 2. Yes, Vietnamese individuals/communities. 
 3. Yes, American individuals/communities. 
 4. Yes, other. 
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 5. No. 
 
Does this article provide an example of someone negatively affected by the issue?  
 1. Yes, example of a Chinese individual. 
 2.  Yes, example of a Vietnamese individual. 
 3.  Yes, example of an American individual. 
 4.  No. 
 
 
Economic Consequences 
Is there a reference to economic consequences of pursuing or not pursuing a course of 
action? 
 1  Yes 
 2  No 
 
Does this article mention any financial losses or gains linked to this issue/event? 
 1.  Yes, Chinese loss or gain. 
 2.  Yes, Vietnamese loss or gain. 
 3.  Yes, American loss or gain. 
 4.  Yes, other. 
 5.  No 
 
Security 
Does the article suggest that the issue may result in armed conflict? 
 1  Yes 
 2  No   
 
Does the article suggest the issue could reduce security or political stability? 
 1.  Yes, Asian security/stability. 
 2.  Yes, American security/stability. 
 3.  Yes, global security stability. 
 4.  Yes, other. 
 5.  No. 
 
 
 Through the identification of problem, cause and solution, the second 
hypothesis, suggesting that frames challenging a country’s legitimacy will not be used 
by that country’s media, can be tested.  To guide this evaluation, Beetham’s (1991: 16) 
three-part definition of what constitutes political legitimacy will be used to guide a 
discourse analysis.  For instance, in the case of the Spratly Islands, legitimacy will be 
challenged through accusations of illegal claims to territory of the Chinese and 
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Vietnamese governments.  In the case of Agent Orange reparations, the challenge to 
legitimacy will be pointed towards the past actions of the American military—the 
simple act of requesting reparations for using Agent Orange implies its illegality.  
Finally, the cases regarding human rights will bring to question the legitimacy of the 
Chinese and Vietnamese governments when it comes to the treatment of their people.  
Through analysing how challenges to legitimacy are presented (if they are at all), the 
research hopes to address the question of what frames are most likely to be adopted by 
foreign media by identifying whether a frame challenging notions of a country’s 
legitimacy will be presented.  If the analysis supports the hypothesis, it may suggest 
that frames challenging local legitimacy should not be used in public diplomacy 
messages.  
Testing Hypothesis 3 
 
 Finally, the third hypothesis seeks to find out if the main claims of the indexing 
hypothesis regarding the relationship of political elites and media on foreign affairs is 
correct.  The purpose of testing this hypothesis is to find out to what extent 
oppositional frames from foreign sources are incorporated into mainstream media 
framing.  Foreign news framing is often based on remarks by local elites, such as 
politicians and governmental agencies, who serve as credible sources for journalists 
(Bennett, 1990: 106).  These sources provide references for journalists, though their 
voices are not the only ones presented—as Wolfsfeld (1997) found, under certain 
circumstances challengers can also influence the media.  Therefore, this study will 
evaluate the framing of American political elites and mainstream media in each case 
study in order to assess when frames employed by foreign media but not local political 
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elites enters local media coverage of foreign affairs4.  To do this, statements from the 
American political elite will undergo the same content and discourse analysis as the 
media stories.  These results will be compared and contrasted to the findings from the 
analysis of the media. 
 These findings will attempt to add a new element to existing research on how 
the parameters of media framing on international relations is determined, allowing for 
identification of the factors that might allow for effective public diplomacy messaging. 
Specifically, it is through this comparison that this study hopes to develop an 
understanding of whether or not messages need to correspond with local elite debate in 
order to gain media attention in that country.  This will add an important element to the 
research question’s answer regarding what qualities a frame should have in order to 
increase the likelihood of its adoption by foreign media.   
 
 
Data Collection  
 Due to the timeline and scope of this research, an 18-month span from January 
1, 2010 to June 30, 2011 was chosen as a sample and articles published during this 
time were collected.  Within this time span, there was a disparity in regards to the 
number of articles produced by each media outlet.  Searches of the Chinese and the 
American media yielded numerous results, the searches were ordered for relevance in 
the Factiva database and enough results were selected to give a confidence level of 
95% and a confidence interval of 10.  As fewer results were returned by the other                                                         4 Statements made by Chinese and Vietnamese political elites were not studied due to 
the limited scope of this project, however given the strict governmental control of 
journalism in these countries (van Leeuwen, 2006: 219, Sun, 2002: 17-8), it is assumed 
that elite statements would not be notably different from the framing reflected in the 
national media outlets. 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outlets, all relevant articles from the Vietnam Foreign Press Centre and Unites States 
State Department, Senate and House of Representatives were analysed.   
 Articles covering the case study issues came from outlets representing four 
groups (Chinese media, Vietnamese media, American mainstream media and 
American elites).  The Chinese media chosen for this study came from Xinhua, a state-
run press agency.  This organisation was founded in the 1930s, originally as a 
propaganda tool for the Chinese Communist Party.  Recently, however, Xinhua has 
been undergoing a transformation into a profitable, comprehensive news service.  
Despite these developments, Xinhua remains loyal to the Chinese Communist Party, 
and continues to reflect their political and social objectives (Hong, 2011: 389).  Xinhua 
is a prolific organisation, producing approximately 12,000 daily news items about 
China.  The outlet operates websites in six major languages (Chinese, English, French, 
Spanish, Russian and Arabic) and professes to attract 800 million hits per day (China 
View, 2007).  The reach and popularity of this international broadcasting outlet make 
Xinhua a valuable tool for researching Chinese framing of international issues.   
 Articles from Xinhua used in this study were retrieved via the Dow Jones 
Factiva Database.  In the study of the Spratly Islands, articles were found via a search 
for ‘Nansha’ (the Chinese name for the Spratly Islands).  In total, 29 articles were 
recovered.  Articles covering human rights in China were found via a search for 
‘human rights’ and ‘China’.  These were sorted by relevance and the first 81 out of 500 
articles were chosen.  
 Article from the Vietnamese media was provided by the Vietnam Foreign Press 
Centre, a state-run organisation.  The Vietnam Foreign Press Centre was established in 
1983 to assist foreign journalists reporting on Vietnam by providing logistical support 
and written content (Foreign Press Centre 2009).  This organisation typically posts four 
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news pieces a day on its website (www.presscenter.org.vn/en/), all collected from 
different Vietnamese news agencies, such as Voice of Vietnam and Vietnam News. 
 These agencies translate their articles from Vietnamese into English (van Leeuwen, 
2006: 218).  Though this sample represents a variety of Vietnamese news producers, 
the strict control of Vietnamese media (the level of state control is comparable to that 
of China) means that messages tend to remain true to the government’s official stance 
on foreign policy issues across domestic media outlets.   
 Articles from the Vietnam Foreign Press Centre that were used in this study 
were obtained via a Google search using the preface ‘site:presscenter.org.vn’.  In the 
study of the Spratly Islands, 20 relevant articles were obtained through a search for 
‘Spratly Islands’.  18 relevant results were found on the issue of Vietnam’s human 
rights through a search of ‘human rights’ within the Vietnam Foreign Press Centre’s 
site during the time period observed.  Articles on the issue of Agent Orange reparations 
were found through a search of ‘Agent Orange’, and 27 relevant results were returned. 
 No single outlet was selected to represent the American media, but rather 
samples were taken from both public and private news outlets across the country.  
Articles were found in the Factiva database by filtering search results to include only 
sources from the United States.  Results were then sorted by relevance and selected in 
this order.  This produced a sample of American media for each issue that spanned the 
entire date range as well as a variety of outlets, including government media (such as 
the Voice of America radio station), national for-profit media (such as CNN and The 
Wall Street Journal) and localised media (such as Deseret News from Salt Lake City, 
Utah).    
 In the case of the Spratly Islands, articles were found through the Factiva 
database for a search of ‘Spratly Islands’.  Results were ordered by relevance, and any 
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result over 2,000 words was excluded to eliminate a few instances of news services 
reprinting full texts of bills.  143 results were returned, and the first 58 articles were 
chosen5.  Articles covering the issue of human rights in China were found through the 
Factiva database for a search of ‘human rights’ and ‘China’.  Results were ordered by 
relevance, and any result over 2,000 words was excluded.  19,610 results were 
returned, and the first 96 articles were chosen.  Articles on the subject of Vietnamese 
human rights abuses were found through the Factiva database for a search of ‘human 
rights’ and ‘Vietnam’.  Results were ordered by relevance, and any result over 2,000 
words was excluded.  The first 94 articles were chosen.  For the case study of Agent 
Orange reparations, articles were found through a search for ‘Agent Orange and 
Vietnam’.  Most items returned focused on the effect of Agent Orange in American 
veterans of the Vietnam War, but 20 articles were found with relevance to reparations 
to Vietnam. 
 Statements made by American elites were also evaluated for the purposes of 
comparing results to those of the American media.  Through this comparison, the 
research will test the third hypothesis regarding elite influence over frames.  The 
sources included in this component of the study were press releases, remarks and 
testimony from the United States Department of State (retrieved from www.state.gov) 
as well as remarks and press releases issued by United States senators (retrieved from 
www.senate.gov) and congressmen (www.house.gov).  These statements reflected both 
major political parties, which should offer a comprehensive look at the parameters of 
the debate among American elites. 
 In the study of the Spratly Islands, 10 relevant search results were found for the 
time period.  These results were found through searches of ‘Spratly Islands’ (the                                                         5 This gives a confidence level of 95% and a confidence interval of 10.  This criteria 
was used in all cases when selecting a sample from a large pool of articles. 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United States refers to the Spratly Islands rather than the Nansha Islands) on the 
websites of the US State Department, the United States Senate and the House of 
Representatives.  On the issue of human rights abuses in China, 29 relevant search 
results were found.  These results were found through searches of ‘China’ and ‘human 
rights’ on the websites of the US State Department, the United States Senate and the 
House of Representatives.  For Vietnamese human rights abuses, 27 relevant results 
from the time period observed were found through searches for ‘Vietnam human 
rights’ on the websites of the US State Department, the United States Senate and the 
United States House of Representatives.   16 relevant results were found regard the 
effect of Agent Orange on Vietnam, and the United States’ responsibility to make 
reparations.  These results were found through a search of ‘agent orange’ and 
‘Vietnamese’ on the websites of the US State Department, the United States Senate 
and the United States House of Representatives.  10% of the articles were tested for 
inter-coder reliability, and a score of 7 or above on the Krippendorf’s Alpha was 
achieved for each variable. 
 
 Xinhua Vietnam 
Foreign Press 
Centre 
American 
Elites 
American 
Media 
Human Rights 
in China 
81  29 96 
Human Rights 
in Vietnam 
 18 27 94 
Dispute Over 
Spratly 
Islands 
29 20 10 58 
Agent Orange 
Reparations 
 27 16 20 
Table 1. Data sources and sample sizes 
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3.  Case Study: Sovereignty Dispute Over the Spratly Islands 
 
 The Spratly Islands are a chain of uninhabited islands in the South China Sea.  
While the islands themselves are not remarkably valuable, the waters that surround 
them are important as shipping routes and are speculated to be rich in oil and gas 
deposits.  The Spratlys (‘Nansha’ in Chinese) are claimed as sovereign territory of 
China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan.  China has been 
accused to taking a ‘divide and conquer approach’ to the sovereignty conflict, by 
seeking bilateral negotiation with each country laying claim to the islands (Reuters, 22 
March 2012).  China’s great political and economic clout gives the country has a 
definitive advantage over its Southeast Asian neighbours.  Due to this imbalance of 
power, the option of negotiating bilaterally leaves the smaller countries at a 
disadvantage at the bargaining table.  Without any political or economic leverage, the 
smaller countries have struggled to sway China on the issue.   
 As Termsak Chalermpalanupap, Director of ASEAN’s Political and Security 
Directorate, explains: “[the ASEAN claimants] cannot go into bilateral [negotiations] 
because of the Chinese assumption that everything belongs to China.  Certainly you 
can’t offer what you don’t own” (States News Service, 21 June 2011).  With nothing to 
offer the Asian superpower, the smaller countries are looking beyond bilateral 
negotiations for a solution.  Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines have sought both 
the support of the ASEAN organisation as well as the United States government.   
 China, however, feels that international interference in the issue is a threat to 
regional stability.  China argues that the issue does not affect the countries as a 
collective, nor the ASEAN organisation as a whole, and thus should be resolved 
bilaterally (States News Service, 14 June 2011). By internationalising the issue, China 
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feels that the Southeast Asian nations are escalating what should be a regional problem 
into an international issue. 
 United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has declared that the United 
States remains neutral in the conflict, though the country does have a national interest 
in protecting the freedom and security of the shipping passages in the South China Sea 
(States News Service, 20 June 2011).  Additionally, the United States has a defence 
treaty with the Philippines that would require the US to support the Philippines in a 
conflict.   
 Further complicating the issue is the United States’ relationship with China.  A 
rising global power, China owns some of the United States’ debt, giving the Asian 
country economic leverage in negotiations.  This gives the possibility of conflict with 
China additional ramifications for the American economy, something that would 
concern policymakers.  On the other hand, the relationship between the United States 
and China is adversarial in many respects (according to Seton Hall University 
Professor Yang Liyu, the United States views China as its biggest military threat 
(States News Service, 14 June 2011)).  This relationship will doubtlessly evolve in the 
coming years, but as it is, the two countries remain fairly wary and cautious of each 
other. 
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Hypothesis 1 and the Spratly Islands Case 
 
 This hypothesis seeks to understand what frame structures are most widely 
accepted internationally by evaluating the frequency of different frame types used by 
the media outlets from the United States, China and Vietnam.  Figure 1 shows the 
results of the content analysis, which find that conflict frames are employed most often 
to describe the Spratly Islands issue: 68.4% of the Vietnam Foreign Press Centre, 
86.2% of Xinhua and 96.6% of the American media identify the issue as a conflict 
between two or more countries.  Also as hypothesised, responsibility frames are the 
second most common frame type among all media outlets.  73.7% of Vietnam Foreign 
Press Centre, 75.8% of Xinhua and 65.5% of American media articles employ some 
element of responsibility framing.  However, it should be noted that this case study 
features a potential military conflict and finding conflict and responsibility frames 
prevalent here does not imply they will be used widely for every issue.  While the 
hypothesis is supported here through common use of conflict frames, the subsequent 
case studies will provide a better test of this hypothesis.  
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 Xinhua Vietnam Foreign 
Press Centre 
American Media 
Conflict Frames 86.2% 73.7% 96.5% 
Responsibility 
Frames 
75.8% 73.7% 65.5% 
Human consequence 
Frames 
3.4% 5% 5.2% 
Economic Frames 0.4% 21% 58.6% 
Security Frames 37.9% 15.7% 60.3% 
Figure 1. 
 Consequence frames are the third frame type evaluated by this hypothesis, and 
are divided into three separate structures for the content analysis: human consequence, 
economic and security frames.  Figure 2 shows their respective use in this issue. 
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 Xinhua Vietnam Foreign 
Press Centre 
American Media 
Economic Frames 0.4% 21% 58.6% 
Human Consequence 
Frames 
3.4% 5% 5.2% 
Security Frames 37.9% 15.7% 60.3% 
Figure 2. 
 Of the consequence frame types, security frames are the most common, with 
15.8% of articles from the Vietnam Foreign Press Centre, 37.9% of articles from 
Xinhua, and 60% of articles from the American media use security frames for this 
issue.  The nature of this issue is that of a territorial dispute between Asian countries, 
and the question of regional security and stability naturally follows.  Interestingly, the 
Asian media is less likely to see the conflict as tied to security than the American 
media.  Given the location of the conflict, it could be presumed that China and 
Vietnam would be more concerned than the United States about the security 
consequences of this issue.  That the United States used this frame type so often for an 
issue so geographically far away may speak to an American interest in this frame type, 
perhaps, the more sensationalist nature of private media. 
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 Economic frames are the most common consequence frame type found in the 
Vietnamese media, and are also commonly used by the American media (58.6% of the 
American articles and 21% of the Vietnamese articles).  The dispute over the Spratly 
Islands centres around the ownership of valuable resources and has the potential to be 
framed as an economic issue, yet this frame type is extremely uncommon in articles 
from Xinhua (0.4%).  Pursuit of economic development has been previously identified 
as a common, previously accepted theme in Chinese media (de Burgh, 2003: 171), but 
it appears that Xinhua does not see significant economic consequences for this issue.  
Further research would be required to determine whether this frame structure was not 
used due to political reasons or if use of economic consequence frames structures is 
limited to certain types of issues.  
Hypothesis 2 and the Spratly Islands Case  
 The second hypothesis seeks to identify any cases of foreign frames 
challenging a state’s legitimacy, and whether these frames are ever presented by that 
country’s media.  Through testing this hypothesis, this study hopes to identify the 
importance of constructing public diplomacy messages within the existing parameters 
of a country’s sense of legitimacy.  In this case study, legitimacy is most likely to be 
questioned when China or Vietnam claims sovereignty over the islands, an act 
considered to be illegal by the other claimant.  Additionally, the United States’ interest 
and potential intervention in the dispute could also be presented as illegitimate by the 
Chinese media—a case of the dominant actor (the United States) violating the wishes 
and rules of the subordinate (China).  The results of the discourse analysis are 
summarised in Table 2.  
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Table 2.  Summary of Most Common Conflict, Cause and Solution by Outlet 
 Vietnam Foreign 
Press Centre 
Xinhua American Media 
Conflict Conflict with 
China over 
Spratly Islands 
Conflicts with 
Southeast Asian 
countries over Spratly 
Islands; issue is being 
‘internationalised’ 
Conflict between 
China and 
Southeast Asian 
countries over 
Spratly Islands; 
China is growing 
as a political 
power 
Cause China is falsely 
claiming 
sovereignty over 
the islands 
Disagreement over 
sovereignty; United 
States is pursuing a 
political agenda by 
getting involved 
Disagreement over 
sovereignty; China 
grabbing resources 
to support its rapid 
development 
Solution China should 
respect Vietnam’s 
sovereign rights 
to the islands 
Direct, bi-lateral 
negotiations between 
relevant countries; 
Southeast Asian 
countries to cease 
violating China’s 
sovereignty 
Asian countries 
should negotiate 
peacefully; 
American officials 
need to stand up to 
China 
  
 For this issue, all of the outlets largely define the problem in the same way: 
86.2% of articles from Xinhua, 68.4% of the articles from the Vietnam Foreign Press 
Centre, and 87.9% of articles from the American media, frame the issue as a conflict 
between China and one or more of the Southeast Asian countries laying claim to the 
islands (articles from the Vietnam Foreign Press Centre describe it more specifically as 
a conflict between China and Vietnam)6.  The focus of this conflict is over who has                                                         6 For the purposes of data in this section, the ‘non-Chinese, non-American actors’ 
Xinhua occasionally blamed or described as responsible for resolving the issue will be 
represented as ‘Vietnam’.  The reason for this is that the coding reflected cases in 
which Southeast Asian countries were blamed, including Vietnam though perhaps not 
explicitly naming the country.  As far as foreign policy is concerned, which is the goal 
of public diplomacy, Vietnam is a part of the ASEAN group that is opposing China’s 
  61 
sovereign right to the Spratly Islands.  Occasionally, the United States is identified as a 
party involved in the conflict, (13.8% of articles from Xinhua, 5.3% from the Vietnam 
Foreign Press Centre, 19% from the American media) though always in a related 
problem and never as the main source of tension in the South China Sea. 
 In the Xinhua articles identifying the United States as involved in the conflict, 
the United States is accused of ‘internationalising’ a regional issue in an attempt to 
gain more political traction in East Asia (Xinhua, 21 September 2010; Xinhua, 30 
December 2010; Xinhua, 14 June 2011).  In Xinhua’s framing of the issue as a 
problem of American intervention, the United States’ attempt to ‘internationalise’ the 
issue for its own political benefit was the cause of the problem (13.8% of articles from 
Xinhua blamed the United States for the problem).  Xinhua presents no consequences 
relevant to the United States—neither Chinese nor Vietnamese news indicate that 
security or economic implications extended beyond Asia—indicating that Xinhua does 
not see any justifiable reason for American intervention.   
 There was some overlap regarding the general cause of the issue (often 
presented as a general misunderstanding of who had rights to the islands), but overall 
the outlets had differing interpretations of who is largely at fault and who is 
responsible for the solution.  This is illustrated in Figures 3 and 4.  The Vietnam 
Foreign Press Centre attributes most of the blame to China (68.4% of articles from the 
Vietnam Foreign Press).  Xinhua did not assign any blame in over half of the articles, 
and in cases where it did, blame was directed at others (34.6% of blame was placed on 
other claimants, 13.8% of blame was place on the United States).   
                                                        
claim to the Spratly Islands.  Therefore, it is reasonable to count these cases as blaming 
Vietnam, though it may not have been explicitly named. 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 Xinhua Vietnam Foreign 
Press Centre 
American Media 
No Blame 55.2% 26.3% 34.5% 
China to Blame  68.4% 56.9% 
Vietnam to Blame 33.4%  10.2% 
United States to 
Blame 
13.8% 5.3% 5.1% 
Figure 3. 
 The solutions put forth for this problem are even more diverse—no single 
proposal dominates the framing of any single country, much less shared across several.  
Often, a suggestion is made to resolve the issue through dialogue and negotiations.  
However, Vietnam and China both appear unwilling to budge on the issue of their 
country’s rights to the islands, each country asking the other to respect their sovereign 
rights to the islands.  When China or Vietnam promote the use of friendly, bi-lateral 
negotiations to resolve the issue, neither indicate a willingness to compromise its 
ownership rights—both Xinhua and the Vietnam Foreign Press Centre place the onus 
for resolution more heavily on the opposing country, as is reflected in the content 
analysis results showing responsibility for solution.  
 
0 10 
20 30 
40 50 
60 70 
80 
Vietnam Foreign Press Centre  Xinhua  American Media 
%
 o
f a
rt
ic
le
s 
p
la
ci
n
g 
b
la
m
e 
Who is identified as causing the problem? 
United States Vietnam China 
  63 
 
 Xinhua Vietnam Foreign 
Press Centre 
American Media 
No Solution 24.1% 42.1% 50% 
China to Resolve 
Issue 
24.1% 31.6% 25.9% 
Vietnam to Resolve 
Issue 
55.2% 10.5% 13.8% 
United States to 
Resolve Issue 
6.9% 5.3% 10.3% 
Other Solution 6.9% 10.5% 8.6% 
Figure 4. 
 
 No consensus is found among the American media either: the most consistent 
solution is no solution at all (50%).  The 50% of articles that do propose a solution 
suggest a range of possibilities, including changing the name of the sea (States News 
Service, 21 June 2011), calling on the relevant countries to resolve their claims and 
share the waters (Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 13 October 2010), as well as condemning 
China and promoting international dialogue.   
 The significant commonality between all of the proposed causes and solutions 
is that none question the legitimacy of the media outlet’s home country despite these 
challenges existing in foreign frames.  For instance, the Vietnam and China question 
0 10 
20 30 
40 50 
60 70 
80 90 
100 
Xinhua  Vietnam Foreign Press Centre  American Media 
%
 o
f a
rt
ic
le
s 
Who Is Responsible for the Solution? 
United States to Resolve Issue Vietnam to Resolve Issue China to Resolve Issue 
  64 
one another’s following of established rules when they argue accuse each other of 
sovereignty violations—accusations that are represented in the ‘blame’ category of the 
discourse analysis.  Instances of identifying the home country as at fault for cause are 
rare, and are limited to the American media blaming its own country for not 
intervening in the dispute—an extension of the United States’ legitimacy rather than a 
challenge to it.  Solutions also support each country’s own legitimacy by ignoring or 
marginalising oppositional frames suggesting the country withdraw its claim the 
islands (Vietnamese and Chinese media both recommend the other country take this 
action, but never suggest it for their own) or its participation in the dispute (Xinhua’s 
suggestion that the United States has no role in this conflict was occasionally 
mentioned, but widely marginalised by the American media (States News Service, 14 
June 2011, Washington Post, 23 June 2011)).  Overall, these findings support the 
hypothesis and indicate that a challenge to local legitimacy may prevent a foreign 
frame from influencing another country’s media.    
Hypothesis 3 and the Spratly Islands Case  
 This hypothesis is tested by comparing the content from the American media to 
the discourse from the American elites and identifying instances in which frames are 
used by one group and not the other.  Figure 5 shows the results from comparing a 
content analysis of articles from each source.  Here, we see that conflict and 
responsibility frame structure use is very similar between American elites and media.  
Use of consequence frames, however, indicates more variation between elite and 
media framing.  While both used ‘security’ and ‘human consequence’ frames on 
occasion, the American media was more likely overall to use a consequence frame 
structure to describe the issue. 
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 American Elites American Media 
Conflict Frames 100% 96.5% 
Responsibility Frames 70% 65.5% 
Human consequence 
Frames 
 5.2% 
Economic Frames 10% 58.6% 
Security Frames 40% 60.3% 
Figure 5. 
 The tendency of the media to use consequence frame structures may be due to 
its sensationalising nature, which favours the drama and emotionalism that can be 
found in stories focusing more on the potential consequences of an issue than on the 
solutions.  Sensationalism may be most evident among those articles framing the issue 
as a security problem.  Though around a third of articles from both outlets indicate that 
the conflict over the Spratly Islands is related to Asian regional security/stability, few 
articles from the American elites project that this tension may result in armed conflict.  
However, over half of the articles from the American media are willing to make this 
suggestion.  The reason for this may be that the drama of a potential military conflict is 
useful in attracting an audience.  While American elites may need to be considerate of 
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the political ramifications of their suggestions, an American newspaper may feel it has 
more opportunity for dramatic conjecture.   
 The American media also deviates from elite framing by indicating that this 
issue does have consequences relevant to the United States—10.3% of American 
articles indicate this issue has some bearing on global or American security while none 
of the elite statements extend the security concerns beyond Asia.  In these cases, the 
conflict is explained as indicative of China’s military and economic rise.  According to 
these articles, the problem is China’s aggressive rise as a world power, and the 
sovereignty dispute is but an example of China flexing its muscle in the region.  In 
these cases, the problem is identified as China asserting itself in the region in order to 
increase its power (56.9% of American articles blamed China for the problem).  Here, 
American journalists are tapping into a frame that is relevant to their audience—in 
2011, a Pew Research poll found that 65% of Americans view China as either an 
adversary (22%) or a ‘serious problem’ (43%).  20% of Americans identify China as 
the greatest threat to the United States; making China the top perceived threat, just 
above North Korea at 18% (Pew Research Group, 2011).  Through these 
identifications of problem, we see the United States each paint China as a menacing 
hegemony—a frame not presented by China’s media.  
 This frame is used only by the American media, and is not found in the 
American elite statements, indicating it is not a product of indexing.  The media also 
identifies causes of the problem that are not found in elite statements—whenever cause 
is identified by the elites, the problem is blamed on China.  The media, on the other 
hand, also places blame on Vietnam/other Southeast Asian nations and the United 
States.  Further media deviation from elite statements is evident in the solutions 
proposed.  The American elites’ most common solutions involved United States action 
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through intervention or formal condemnation of China (40%), or Chinese action 
through facilitating negotiations (30%) or ceasing its aggressive acts (10%).  Within 
the solutions proposed there was also a wide range of ideas from the American media 
(see Fig 6 and 7).  The variety of solutions proposed here could speak to the flexibility 
of offering solutions in foreign policy issue framing, at least when the local elites have 
not come to a widely accepted solution themselves.    
 
Figure 6. 
 
 
Figure 7. 
No Solution 51% 
United States to resolve alone 10% 
China and Vietnam to Resolve Together 7% 
China and Other Party to Resolve Together 9% 
Vietnam to Resolve Alone 2% 
China to Resolve Alone 9% 
Vietnam and Other Actor to Resolve Together 3%  Other Solution 9% 
American Media Solutions 
No Solution 20%  China to Resolve Alone 10% 
United States to Resolve Alone 40% 
China and Vietnam to Resolve Together 10% 
China and Other Actor to Resolve Together 20% 
Elite Solutions 
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 These discrepancies between elite and media framing challenge the work of 
Bennett (1990) and Hallin (1989), both of who suggest that frames not used by elites 
will not be present in the media.  So where did these frames originate?  Althaus 
(2003:395) suggests that international sources may influence framing, though this case 
does not indicate that frames were adopted from foreign media sources.  Examination 
of some of the articles that employ this framing (Investor’s Business Daily, 22 July 
2010; Wall Street Journal, 28 July 2010, Wall Street Journal, 4 March 2011, Wall 
Street Journal, 5 March 2011) finds that these claims are sourced from Americans, 
such as a top American military officer, a public policy researcher, a foreign affairs 
researcher as well as from the journalists themselves. 
 Additionally, by incorporating results from Xinhua and the Vietnam Foreign 
Press Centre, it appears that these outlets did not influence the American’ media’s use 
of security frames.  Figures 8 and 9 both show that the American media’s use of 
security frames does not follow the lead of either Asian outlet or the American elites.   
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 Xinhua Vietnam Foreign 
Press Centre 
American Media American 
Elites 
No Security 
Consequences 
58.6% 84.2% 39.7% 60% 
Consequences for 
Asian Security 
37.9% 15.3% 50% 40% 
Consequences for 
American Security 
  1.7%  
Consequences for 
Global Security 
  8.6%  
Figure 8. 
 
 
0 10 
20 30 
40 50 
60 70 
Vietnam Foreign Press Centre  Xinhua  American Elites  American Media 
%
 o
f a
rt
ic
le
s 
Does the article indicate that the issue is tied to regional or 
international security/stability? 
Global Security American Security Asian Security/Stability 
  70 
 
 Xinhua Vietnam 
Foreign Press 
Centre 
American 
Media 
American Elites 
No suggestion 
armed conflict 
may result 
93.1% 94.7% 44.8% 80% 
Suggestion armed 
conflict may result 
6.9% 5.3% 55.2% 20% 
Figure 9.  
 
 The findings here indicate that while frames outside of the parameters of elite 
debate are presented, these frames are not adopted from foreign sources.  This finding 
stands in stark contrast to other studies challenging the indexing hypothesis, in which 
foreign sources are found frequently.  Althaus, Edy, Entman and Phalen (1996) find 
that in coverage of the Libya crisis in the 1980s, 52% of sources cited in the New York 
Times were foreign.  That study, however, coded for sources rather than frames.  It is 
quite possible that if a similar methodology had been applied here, a number of foreign 
sources would have surfaced, though perhaps not in the articles challenging the 
framing of the American elites.     
0% 10% 
20% 30% 
40% 50% 
60% 70% 
80% 90% 
100% 
Vietnam Foreign Press Centre  Xinhua  American Elites  American Media 
Does the article suggest that the issue may result in armed 
conflict? 
No Yes 
  71 
Conclusions 
 Overall, the findings in this case study support all three hypotheses, though 
with some caveats regarding the application of these findings to public diplomacy.  In 
regards to frame structure, it appears that conflict and responsibility frames are widely 
used across cultures to describe this issue.  The consequence frame types appear less 
frequently and unevenly among the countries.  For instance, the American media uses 
security frames more than any other consequence frame, while the Vietnam Foreign 
Press Centre uses economic frames the most of the consequence frame types.  These 
inconsistencies are consistent with previous work on international issues framing.  
However, the nature of the issue is conducive to conflict and responsibility frames and 
their prevalence in this case should not be taken as fact of their overall use.  It will be 
interesting to see whether these trends hold in other case studies going forward.   
   In testing hypothesis 2, the study found no instances of frames challenging the 
legitimacy of a country presented in the local media, despite the existence of these 
frames in foreign media.  As such, the American frames presenting China as using the 
Spratly Islands conflict as part of its expansionist plan was never used in China.  
Conversely, the Chinese framing that the United States was using the Spratly Islands 
conflict as a justification for pursuing political agendas in Asia was never used by the 
American media.  These findings support the hypothesis and suggest that frames 
challenging a country’s legitimacy may not influence foreign media through public 
diplomacy communications. 
 If a challenge to legitimacy is consistently found to be outside the realm of 
what a nation’s media will find acceptable, this may be a better threshold for the 
Sphere of Deviance than the parameters of elite debate as suggested by Hallin (1989) 
and Mermin (1999).  Through the comparison of political elite and media framing, it 
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appears that the American media presented a number of ideas that were not found in 
the elite discourse, such as additional causes, solutions and consequences.  These 
findings are not consistent with the indexing theory as the guiding force behind news 
framing of foreign policy issues in the United States.  A more fitting explanation may 
be Wolfsfeld’s (1997: 45) proposal that alternative frames that are consistent within a 
nation’s political culture will join the framing competition.  Althaus (2003) suggests 
that foreign sources often inform the debate, resulting in alternative frames used by the 
media.  However, no evidence of foreign influence on American media was found in 
this case study, implying that the limitations of the indexing theory do not necessarily 
mean foreign frames outside of elite debate will be adopted by journalists.  Indeed, it 
appears that the foreign frames examined have not influenced the American media in 
this case. 
 Returning to the question guiding this research, we ask what news frames from 
foreign sources appear most likely to be adopted by local media and audiences?  The 
findings of this study have shown that challenges to the legitimacy of the media’s 
origin country are not likely to be adopted, indicating that such a frame is likely to fall 
into the Sphere of Deviance and will not be adopted.  The study also found the 
indexing theory not to be comprehensive enough to preclude the use of any 
oppositional frames in the media.  This could imply that there is a middle ground 
between consistency with elite framing and an outright challenge to legitimacy, in 
which frames can provide oppositional or challenging ideas while still being accepted 
by local media.  An identification of these parameters of acceptable, oppositional 
debate will be sought throughout the next case studies.   
 It is also worthwhile to note that in areas where the American media deviated 
from elite framing, frames used did not appear to be sourced internationally.  This 
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prompts the question of whether the qualities of foreign frames prevent them from 
being used by American media, a question that will be considered throughout the next 
three case studies.  Although the limitations of this case study may also be a reason—it 
is possible that other foreign sources with political systems and cultures more similar 
to those of the United States (for instance, Canada or the United Kingdom) would be 
uncovered with a more thorough analysis.  As this thesis is more concerned with 
communication between dissimilar countries, this possibility has not been investigated 
here though it may be a worthy area for future study. 
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4.  Case Study: Agent Orange Reparations 
 
 
 
 Agent Orange is the codename for a powerful dioxin used by the American 
military to defoliate large areas of Vietnam during the Vietnam War.  The intention of 
using the herbicide was to eliminate the food and shelter of Viet Cong soldiers as well 
as to force urbanisation among civilians as part of the American war strategy (Stellman 
et al., 2003, cited in Palmer, 2007: 172).  The dioxin was sprayed on over three million 
hectares of forest, disrupting ecosystems by removing tree cover.  Aside from its 
intended and deleterious effect on plant life, contact with Agent Orange has also been 
linked to a number of human health issues (Palmer, 2007: 174).  These include severe 
birth defects and increased miscarriages, nerve disorders and a number of cancers.  The 
dioxin has leeched into the soil of affected areas and therefore entered the food system 
through plants, animals and fish, continues to cause health problems for people living 
in certain rural areas of Vietnam.  Vietnam claims to have up to three million citizens 
affected by Agent Orange, though some American authorities have argued that the 
Vietnamese are discounting the possibility of birth defects being caused by 
malnutrition and environmental factors (Tulsa World, 23 May 2010).   
 To pay for the damage to human health and the environment, Vietnam is 
petitioning the United States for reparations.  Specifically, a figure of $300 million has 
been quoted as necessary to adequately clean up the ‘hotspots’ where Agent Orange in 
the soil continues to affect the health of the Vietnamese people.   
 Adding to the complexity of the issue are the American soldiers who have also 
reported health problems.  American veterans who were exposed to Agent Orange and 
suffer from one of 17 associated conditions receive treatment paid for by the US 
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government.  Additionally, children born to these servicemen who suffer from spine 
bifida also qualify for free medical care (Tulsa World, 23 May 2010).  Interest groups 
representing the veterans often lobby for increased funding and medical services, 
which may make the issue of reparations towards Vietnam more accessible, available 
and applicable for Americans.  
 The issue of Agent Orange reparations is one without many disputed facts, and 
it is difficult to find a frame in which the United States is not largely at fault for the 
problem.  As such, this case study offers a clear opportunity for the American media to 
view its country of origin as at fault—perhaps the best way to test the willingness of 
media to use frames that challenge their country’s legitimacy.  Additionally, this issue 
focuses on consequences to an action taken decades earlier.  As such, this may provide 
an opportunity for consequence frame structures to emerge as dominant in coverage 
and provide interesting results when testing the second hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 1 and the Agent Orange Case 
    The findings from the Spratly Islands case study supported the hypothesis, 
however it was noted that the Spratly Islands issue is perhaps more appropriate for 
conflict and responsibility frames than other issues might be.  The issue of Agent 
Orange reparations, for instance, may provide different results.  Here, the conflict 
causing the problem has long been resolved, and consequence frames may be more 
fitting.  This case should offer a test of the strength of conflict and responsibility 
frames in international issues. 
 Results from the content analysis, as illustrated in Figure 10, show that conflict 
frames are found far less often than responsibility frames in this issue.  The Vietnam 
Foreign Press Centre uses some element of conflict framing in 22.2% of their articles, 
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and the American media uses conflict frames in only 10.5% of their articles to describe 
this issue.  The results find that while conflict frames are not often sed,  responsibility 
frames dominate the Agent Orange issue.  This is consistent with the hypothesis and 
with the findings from the first case study.   
 
 
 Vietnam Foreign Press 
Centre 
American Media 
Conflict Frames 22.2% 10.5% 
Responsibility Frames 85.1% 89.5% 
Human consequence 
Frames 
11.1% 15.7% 
Economic Frames  5.2% 
Figure 10. 
 
 
 It was anticipated that this case study might provide a suitable circumstance for 
consequence frames.  However, they are not widely used in this issue.  Neither media 
outlet used significant economic7 or security frames, and only 11.1% of articles from 
                                                        7 Though the issue of money surfaced in most articles about this issue, the mention 
never extended beyond a reference to sums wanted from, or pledged by, the United 
States to resolve the problem.  Without any explanation of the ramifications of these 
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the Vietnam Foreign Press Centre, and 15.7% from the American media employed 
elements of human consequence framing.  The limited use of human consequence 
framing is a noteworthy observation from these findings.  The nature of the issue 
provides ample opportunity to employ human consequence framing, and the 
Vietnamese outlet, in particular, could employ these frame as a way to illustrate the 
problem and garner sympathy for Vietnamese victims of Agent Orange.  If 
consequence frames are linked to sensationalist news values though, it is possible that 
the Vietnamese press is simply disinclined to use human consequence frames in 
general.   
 Overall, the results of this case study support the roles of widespread use of 
responsibility frames as well as the limited used of consequence framing.  These 
findings do, however, bring into question the widespread use of conflict framing 
suggested by the hypothesis.  Possibly, conflict framing grows less relevant as time 
passes, though further study would be needed to confirm this.  This finding indicates 
that conflict frames, like consequence frames, may be reliant on an appropriate context 
for use, whereas responsibility frame structures may be suitable for most issues.  It is 
also worth noting that there does not appear to be any negative correlation between use 
of conflict frames and use of consequence frames—indicating that the resolution of a 
conflict does not necessarily result in a context in which consequence frames are 
widely used.       
                                                        
sums on the economy of the United States or Vietnam, mention of money was not 
identified as part of an economic consequence frame. 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Hypothesis 2 and the Agent Orange Case    Results from the first case study supported this hypothesis by finding several 
cases in which challenging frames were used in one country and not another.  Due to 
the nature of the Agent Orange case study, challenging frames may be more difficult to 
avoid.  The very fact of requesting reparations for an action suggests that the United 
States acted outside of the established rules for international military conflict.  This 
study may therefore address how a country’s media handles challenges to legitimacy.  
Such findings can be used for a better understanding of what types of whether a 
challenge to a state’s legitimacy in news frames can influence a foreign media or 
whether such frames will be ignored. 
 The findings of the discourse analysis are highlighted in Table 3: 
Table 3.  Summary of Most Common Conflict, Cause and Solution by Outlet 
 Vietnam Foreign Press 
Centre 
American Media 
Problem Lasting effects of Agent 
Orange 
Lasting effects of Agent 
Orange 
Cause Use of Agent Orange by 
the United States during 
the war 
Use of Agent Orange by 
the United States during 
the war 
Solution United States to fund 
cleanup and support 
victims 
United States to fund 
cleanup and support 
victims 
 
 In this case study, identification of problem and cause is consistent between the 
countries.  Based on these results, the problem appears as the legacy of Agent Orange 
used in Vietnam in the 1960s and early 70s.  In articles that place blame, cause is given 
as the United States’ use of the dioxin during the war, though a number of articles do 
not refer specifically to the United States as having used Agent Orange—51.9% of 
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articles from the Vietnam Foreign Press Centre, and 31.6% from the American media 
do not place explicit blame.  Rather, these articles simply refer to the legacy of Agent 
Orange as the problem and then move on to discuss the ways in which Vietnam and 
the United States are working together on the solution.   
 As in the identification of problem and cause, the proposed solution is also 
generally consistent across the outlets: money is needed to clean up remaining Agent 
Orange ‘hotspots’ as well as to support those suffering the health effects of the dioxin.  
Though Vietnam is expected to be involved in several of the articles, the responsibility 
for providing the money was largely placed on the United States.  81.5% of articles 
from the Vietnam Foreign Press Centre, and 78.9% from the American Media suggest 
the United States is at least partially responsible for the solution.  Included in these are 
3.7% of articles from the Vietnam Foreign Press Centre and 10.5% from the American 
media that propose that Vietnam and the United States take action together.  Use of 
frames suggesting the United States is implicated in either the cause or solution is 
visualised in Figure 11, while causes from both outlets are shown in Figures 12 and 13.   
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 Vietnam Foreign Press Centre American Media 
No Blame 51.9% 31.6% 
Blame on United States 48.1% 68.4% 
No Solution 14.8% 10.5% 
United States Responsible for 
Solution 
81.5% 78.9% 
Vietnam Responsible for 
Solution 
3.7% 10.5% 
Other Solution 3.7% 10.5% 
Figure 11. 
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Figure 12. 
 
 
Figure 13. 
 
 Some Vietnamese articles suggest another cause, one that does question current 
American actions.  These articles accuse the United States of not doing enough to fulfil 
its responsibility to the Vietnamese victims of Agent Orange, especially in light of the 
billions of dollars that went towards treating American veterans suffering from the 
effects of the dioxin (more evidence for dioxin victims’ lawsuit against US, Voice of 
Vietnam, 6 May 2011).  Though this frame is used rarely by the Vietnam Foreign Press 
No Cause IdentiUied 52% 
Caused by United States, ConUlict with United States 7% 
Blame on United States, No ConUlict 41% 
Cause of the Agent Orange Issue in Vietnamese Coverage 
American 68% 
No Cause IdentiUied 32% 
Cause of Agent Orange Issue in American Media Coverage 
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Centre, it is never used by the American elites or media.  Again, it seems that the 
American media is averse to adopting frames that challenge the legitimacy of 
American actions—in this example the challenge arises from the subordinate actor 
(Vietnam) rejecting the legality of the actions of the dominant actor (the United 
States).  
 The findings of this framing analysis have interesting implications for the 
hypothesis.  On the surface, it appears that the American media uses frames 
challenging American legitimacy to describe this issue.  However, it should be noted 
that these frames do not question the recent actions of the country, but rather what was 
done in the distant past.  No frames challenging the United States’ current actions, 
such as the Vietnamese frames suggest that the United States is not paying enough in 
reparations, are presented by the American media or elites.  While a dispute over how 
much money is owed is hardly as significant as accusing the United States of a war 
crime, the former was omitted from American framing while the latter was extremely 
common.  This finding may therefore support the hypothesis, albeit with the caveat 
that frames questioning the legitimacy of past actions are treated differently to frames 
questioning current policies and values. 
 
Hypothesis 3 and the Agent Orange Case  
 This hypothesis is designed to test the indexing theory regarding who 
influences media framing of international issues.  Results from the Spratly Islands case 
study did find evidence of the media deviating from elite frames, though did not find 
any international sources behind this divergence.  While journalists appear willing to 
look outside of the debate legitimised by the elite, the ability of a foreign source to 
introduce new framing is not yet established.  This case study did not provide any 
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evidence of this occurring, in fact the framing presented by the American media 
closely follow the elite debate.  Findings from the discourse analysis indicate that the 
problem, cause and solution for this issue is the same between media and elites: the 
problem was caused by the United States and the United States is largely responsible 
for resolving it.  The American media explicitly blames the United States more often 
than the elites do (68.4% of media articles, compared to 37.5% of elite statements), 
though this could be due to the necessity of fully explaining the issue to its audience in 
each article, while American elites may be able to assume their audience already 
understands the cause of the problem.     
 Figure 14 shows that frame structure is also used similarly between the elites 
and the media: responsibility frames are common while conflict and consequence 
frames were used less often.  Among the consequence frames, economic frames are 
used more often by the elites, and human consequence frames are used more often by 
the media, but overall no significant differences are evident.   
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 American Media American Elites 
Conflict Frames 10.5% 6.3% 
Responsibility Frames 89.5% 87.5% 
Human consequence 
Frames 
15.7% 6.3% 
Economic Frames 5.2% 25% 
Figure 14.   
Conclusions 
 
 The results of this case study are less supportive of the three hypotheses than 
the results of the Spratly Islands case were.   First, findings regarding frame structure 
were also inconsistent with the hypothesis, indicating that conflict frame types are not 
as universally applicable as suggested.  This indicates that conflict frames, like 
consequence frames, may be tied to context and only used when appropriate.  One 
possible explanation for this is the amount of time that has passed between the cause of 
the problem (which was identified by the articles as the use of Agent Orange in the 
1960s) and today.  Camaj tracked the use of conflict frames over time in her study on 
Kosovo negotiations, and found no decrease in use of conflict frames as the situation 
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resolved (2010: 647).  However, her timeline was much shorter than the decades that 
have passed between the 1960s and today.  It is possible that by avoiding conflict 
frames, the attribution of blame becomes less adversarial and therefore less explicitly 
challenging to the audience.  This suggestion could perhaps be examined with cases 
playing out over varying spans of time to see if there is a point in which conflict 
frames lose their applicability.   
 The frame analysis found that frames challenging the legitimacy of American 
actions during the 1960s are ubiquitous in American media and elite framing.  This 
finding also challenges its hypothesis.  However, this case study may have some 
qualities that set it apart from previous studies.  For instance, it is possible that 
audiences are more sensitive to challenges to current status quo than to the legitimacy 
of actions past—an idea supported by the finding that the Vietnamese frames 
questioning the United States’ current level of commitment to the reparations is not 
presented in American media.  Presenting the use of Agent Orange as an action taken 
years ago, in special circumstances, it becomes easy to distance a sense of positive 
American identity from the image of a country acting illegitimately in the hopes of 
winning a war.  Through this distance, both of time and political realities, it becomes 
possible for the American audience to understand this issue without any conflict to 
their own sense of legitimacy. 
 Alternatively, an internal battle for legitimacy between the American 
government and American war veterans suffering the effects of Agent Orange may 
have influenced the way the American media frames the issue.  This possible 
amendment to the hypothesis is warrants further investigation, which could be 
achieved through a longitudinal study of American elite and media framing of this 
issue since it first arose.  Also perhaps worth investigating a link between the findings 
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from testing hypothesis 1 and 2, specifically whether the lack of conflict frames is 
linked to the willingness of the American media to identify their country as to blame 
for the issue.     
 Testing of the third hypothesis also finds framing of the Agent Orange issue is 
very similar between the American elites and media.  However, as was seen earlier in 
this chapter, the American framing in this case is also consistent with the framing from 
the Vietnam Foreign Press Centre, indicating that the parameters of debate may have 
been set on an international level.  This idea is furthered when we consider that this is 
a relatively new position for the American government to take: the United States was 
historically reluctant to accept claims to the detrimental health effects of Agent Orange 
(Gough, 1986: 64).  The elite debate has clearly changed over the past forty years, 
possibly bringing it to a synthesis with Vietnam’s perspective on the issue.  Could it be 
that Vietnamese advocates have directly influenced the American elites?  Or perhaps 
Vietnamese news coverage has been introduced to the cascading activation model?  Or 
is this due to the precedent of granting American veterans medical benefits for Agent 
Orange related illnesses?   Further study, incorporating frames from American and 
Vietnamese Agent Orange advocacy groups, is needed to answer this question.  This 
could provide a better understanding of how the parameters of debate are shaped, and 
also suggest opportunities within public diplomacy for influencing foreign elites.  
 In its pursuit of understanding what media frames are most likely to be adopted 
from foreign sources, this case study seems to challenge each hypothesis.  Based on 
the findings, it seems that conflict frames are as variable as consequence frames, that 
messages challenging a state’s legitimacy are used in that country’s media, and that no 
messages deviating from elite statement will influence media framing.  However, each 
of these findings could possibly be explained as an exception to the rule, resulting from 
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the longevity of this issue.  Testing this is outside of the scope of this thesis, but may 
be worth future investigation.  The viability of this suggesting would be useful for 
scholarship regarding the development and evolution of international issues framing.   
 
 
 
 
  88 
5.  Case Study: Human Rights in China    
 Non-profit organisations, governments and individuals around the world have 
accused the Chinese government of egregious human rights violations.  Accusations 
include Internet censorship and torture of dissidents, unfair imprisonment of human 
rights and pro-democracy activists, lawyers, writers, artists and musicians.  Alleged 
human rights violations have been documented and publicised by international 
organisations like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International and governmental 
organisations like the US State Department.  Chinese officials disagree with these 
reports, responding that they represent the views of Western political actors who lack 
an objective understanding of the facts at hand (Xinhua, 19 March 2010).  
Additionally, Chinese officials have cited human rights as being culturally relative, and 
that the prioritisation of individual liberties over the collective good is a Western 
value, not compatible with China’s plan for development (States News Service, 11 
May 2011).  Chinese officials have also responded to accusations with evidence of 
great improvements regarding poverty alleviation throughout the country (19 March 
2010). 
 A specific issue that features prominently in news coverage of the issue 
between 1 January 2010 and 30 June 2011 is the award of the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize.  
The prize was awarded to Liu Xiaobo, a Chinese dissident who was, and remains, 
incarcerated for his part in writing a document that challenged the authority of the 
state.  His wife, Liu Xia, was put under house arrest though she has not been charged 
with a crime.  China protested the award of the Nobel Prize to Liu, who Beijing 
considers to be a convicted criminal, and pressured a number of its trade partners not 
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to attend the ceremony.  Ultimately, fifteen countries (Russia, Kazakhstan, Tunisia, 
Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, Vietnam, Venezuela, Egypt, Sudan, Cuba and 
Morocco) did not send delegates to the ceremony—an indication of either genuine 
support for China or of China’s economic bargaining power.  The United States did 
send a delegation, but the Obama administration was criticised by some members of 
Congress for not speaking out against the imprisonment of Liu Xiaobo. 
 International organisations as well as members of the United States government 
have openly criticised the Obama administration’s inaction on the issue.  While the 
administration has verbally challenged China on their human rights record, the 
administration is often accused of taking a soft stand in favour of maintaining 
economic and diplomatic ties with the China.  The American and Chinese governments 
regularly hold dialogues on the subject of human rights, though no major actions have 
been taken as a result of these conversations.  One reason that the Obama 
administration may be hesitant to apply too much pressure to China is the country’s 
position as a rising global superpower and concerns over the economic and geo-
political ramifications of a conflict. China also holds some American debt, which adds 
a level of complexity to any interaction between the two countries.   
 This case study was chosen for two main reasons.  First, it represents an issue 
in which the Asian and American outlets are in disagreement over the definition of the 
main concept driving the conflict: human rights.  Evaluating an issue whose definition 
is seen as culturally relative8 offers a good example of one of the most difficult aspects 
of international communication.  Identifying any common framing between the United 
                                                        
8 That ‘human rights’ is contentiously defined is itself a contentious claim.  The moral 
debate surrounding the extent to which certain human rights should be considered 
universal is interesting, though does not factor into this research.  Rather, human rights 
will be discussed as culturally relative in the sense that the governments of the United 
States, China and Vietnam promote contrasting definitions of the term. 
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States and China may illuminate framing techniques that can be used to circumvent the 
problem of cultural relativity.  Second, this case study is mirrored by the study of 
human rights in Vietnam.  These issues are superficially very similar, though the 
United States has very different relationships with China and Vietnam and elite 
framing of the human rights issues is bound to reflect this.  A comparison of the 
American media and elite framing used in these issues will provide an idea of how 
strong the indexing effect is in describing international issues. 
 
Chinese Framing of Human Rights 
 
 In the framing of human rights issues in China, Xinhua’s used three very 
distinct packages.  These packages each reflect unique results in the content analysis, 
and may confuse the findings if taken together.  For this reason, it is beneficial to look 
at Xinhua’s articles as three separate data sets, quantified by where blame for the issue 
is placed:  
• Progress: 52.2% of the articles do not place any blame or identify any solution.  
These articles report progress made by the Chinese government in improving 
human rights and promoting an open, international dialogue around the issue.  
These articles focus only on progress and, as a result, do not reflect positive 
answers for any of the coding questions. 
• American intervention: 18% of articles blame the United States for the issue.  
These articles conclude that the real problem at hand is a lack of agreement 
between the countries on what constitutes human rights.  Additionally, the 
United States is occasionally accused of using this issue for political leverage 
and of acting hypocritically.  Of the articles suggesting that the US is to blame 
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for the problem, 80% suggested that the United States holds the solution to the 
problem.  80% of these articles express disapproval of the United States.  
33.33% of these articles focus on the effect of the issue on American 
individuals or communities.   
• Nobel Prize: 20% of the articles placed blame on another, non-American, non-
Chinese party.  Typically, this is the Nobel Committee and countries that 
supported the decision to award the prize to Liu Xiaobo.  72.7% of these 
articles express disapproval of a non-American, non-Chinese party.  63% of 
these articles offer no solution to the problem.  27% suggest the Chinese 
government take action.   
 The existence of the ‘progress’ narrative from Xinhua, featuring articles 
promoting the message that all is well, lack any frame structure recognised by the 
content analysis.  Though the existence of these articles is interesting, this types of 
story would have limited use in public diplomacy messaging—articles that project a 
situation as universally positive are not considered news in Western countries 
(Fawcett, 2011: 253), and would not be expected to influence a Western country’s 
media if used in public diplomacy communication.  Conversely, Western countries 
targeting China (or any country with state-controlled media) would have difficulty 
manipulating this type of frame for use in public diplomacy.  Without a problem or 
cause, there can be no solution and therefore no promotion of policy.  As such, they are 
largely ignored in the findings.  
Hypothesis 1 and the Chinese Human Rights Case    Findings from the previous case studies have thus far supported the 
hypothesis’s suggestion of widespread use of responsibility frames, as well as the 
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limited and isolated use of consequence frames.  Conflict frames, however, have 
emerged as less pervasively used than originally thought, and perhaps more tied to 
context than responsibility frames are.  This issue provides a good opportunity to 
further test the use of conflict frames, as this issue is not distanced by time (as in the 
Agent Orange case), nor is it an explicit conflict over something tangible (as in the 
Spratly Islands case).  Whether conflict frames are used more like responsibility or 
more like consequence frames in the human rights case studies may shed some light on 
when conflict frames are likely to be adopted into media framing from a foreign 
source.  
 As seen in Figure 15, findings are generally consistent with the hypothesis.  
Responsibility frames describing the issue are common in articles from the American 
media, though this type of framing does not appear pervasive at Xinhua.  However, by 
removing data from the ‘progress’ narrative, which does not reflect any frame types in 
the content analysis, responsibility frames are found to be common.  All Xinhua 
articles on the topic of the Nobel Prize and American intervention assign blame, while 
36.4% of Nobel Prize articles and 100% of the American intervention articles propose 
a solution.   
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 Xinhua American Media 
Conflict Frames 41.8% 82.7% 
Responsibility Frames 40% 79.3% 
Human consequence 
Frames 
21.8% 52.8% 
Economic Frames 23.6% 21.8% 
Figure 15. 
 Also consistent with the hypothesis are the findings around conflict frames, 
which are used often by both countries as a way of explaining this issue.  The United 
States typically frames the issue as a conflict (82.8% of articles from the American 
media).  Only 41.8% of all articles from Xinhua describe the issue as a conflict of 
some kind, however by controlling for the influence of the progress articles again, we 
can see that conflict frames are indeed popular at Xinhua as a way to explain this issue.  
Figure16 shows the presence of conflict frames within the ‘Nobel Prize’ and 
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‘American intervention’ narrative, where conflict is common.  
 
Figure 16.     
 Both outlets use human consequence and economic consequence frames to 
illustrate the issue (see Figure 17).  Among Xinhua’s three main narratives, human 
consequence and economic framing was used the most in articles describing 
unwarranted American intervention—18.2% of these articles used human consequence 
framing and 27.3% used some element of economic framing.  The human consequence 
elements typically arise when Xinhua’s stories are intended to point out the hypocrisy 
of American accusations of Chinese human rights violations.  These articles critique 
human rights violations in the United States by placing the focus of the story on the 
lives of Americans.  These articles include statistics on gun violence, poverty, child 
abuse and other societal problems to paint a bleak picture of life in the United States 
(Xinhua, 12 March 2010, Xinhua, 11 April 2011b, Xinhua, 11 April 2011c).  The 
American media uses some element of human consequence framing in over half of 
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their articles (57.5%), most commonly an example of a Chinese individual to illustrate 
the situation (51.7%).     
 
 Xinhua: American 
Intervention 
Xinhua: Nobel Prize American Media 
Economic Frames 27.3% 18.2% 21.8% 
Human consequence 
Frames 
18.2% 27.3% 57.5% 
Figure 17. 
  
 By disregarding data from Xinhua’s ‘progress’ narrative, the hypothesis 
appears supported by the findings from this case study.  As predicted, responsibility 
and conflict frames were commonly used in both countries, while use of responsibility 
frames varied.  Through examining Xinhua’s framing as two different data sets, we see 
that even within one country the use of consequence frame structure is dissimilar.  This 
implies that prevalent use of certain consequence frames is not likely to be found 
consistently in any one country, but rather is highly dependent on the nature of the 
story being told.  This suggests that consequence frame structures may be more 
sensitive to cultural relevancy than conflict and responsibility frame structures are.  It 
follows that these frame types can be used effectively in public diplomacy messages 
when a context salient to the audience can be identified.   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Hypothesis 2 and the Chinese Human Rights Case  
 Findings around hypothesis 2 have thus far been mixed.  The results from the 
first case study indicate that messages challenging a state’s legitimacy will not be used 
by that country’s media, however the results from the second case study suggest that 
there may be exceptions to this.  It is therefore important to continue testing this 
hypothesis, looking for any further exceptions or stronger evidence of support.  As the 
human rights issues revolve around mutual accusations of illegitimacy (through the 
United States accusing the Asian countries of acting outside of internationally 
established rules on human rights and through the Asian countries accusing the United 
States of acting outside of rules recognising sovereignty as primarily important in 
international relations), these case studies are ideal for testing whether or not foreign 
frames challenging a country’s legitimacy will influence that country’s media. 
 The findings from this case study’s discourse analysis are laid out in Table 4. 
Here, we see that the American media identifies this problem as the Chinese 
government violating the human rights of its citizens—47.1% of articles from the 
American media reflect disapproval of China.  5.7% of American media some 
disapproval of the United States, but rather than disapproving of the United States’ 
interference in the issue, as Xinhua does, these articles indicate that the United States 
has not done enough to intercede.  Though oppositional, this framing cannot be 
considered a challenge to the United States’ legitimacy—rather it seeks to extend 
American legitimacy in order to justify action against China.  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Table 4.  Summary of Most Common Conflict, Cause and Solution by Outlet 
 Xinhua (Western 
Intervention) 
Xinhua (Nobel 
Prize) 
Xinhua 
(Progress) 
American 
Media 
Problem Outside criticism 
of China’s human 
rights policies 
Nobel Committee 
awarding Peace 
Prize to a 
criminal 
No problem Human rights 
violations in 
China 
Cause Western political 
agendas; different 
interpretations of 
human rights 
Political agendas; 
viewing Western 
values as 
universal 
No cause Oppressive 
Chinese 
government; 
US not doing 
enough 
Solution West to cease 
criticism; open, 
international 
dialogue on human 
right issue 
China to continue 
along its path to 
development 
China to 
continue 
improving 
the lives of 
its citizens 
US to 
pressure 
China for 
reforms 
 
 An attempt to expand the parameter of legitimate action was also found in the 
American articles explaining the cause of the problem as economic in nature (14.9% of 
American media indicate that this issue has some tie to China’s economy).  Here, 
human rights issues are described as parallel to developing the economic relationship 
between China and the West, and the economy and human rights are discussed 
together in diplomatic meetings (MarketWatch, 28 June 2011).  The nature of this 
relationship is expanded upon in a few articles, explicitly describing the ramifications 
of an imbalanced economic relationship on human rights advocacy (Newsweek, 8 
February 2010, The Wall Street Journal, 18 May 2011).  In these cases, economic 
frames are used as a way to explain why China has been ‘allowed’ by the West to 
violate the human rights of its citizens—indicating that the country sees itself as 
legitimate in intervention. 
 Predictably, the cause identified in the American articles is the Chinese 
government’s oppressive policies.  Figure 18 charts the blame of China among the 
outlets and shows that 70% of the articles in the American media assign blame to 
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China.  14.8% of articles from the American media place some blame on the United 
States.  Solutions are proposed in 46% of articles by the American media, and usually 
indicated that the American government should pressure China for reform (29.9% of 
articles from the American media).  9.2% of articles from American media also 
recommend involving China in an open, international dialogue.  As for the possibility 
of China taking actions to resolve this issue on its own, only 9.2% of articles from the 
American media articles see this as a solution.     
 This framing, where the Chinese government is at fault, is not found in any 
articles from Xinhua.  Within the Xinhua sample, only two of the three main narratives 
suggest a problem, cause and solution.  Stories on both ‘American intervention’ and 
the ‘Nobel Prize’ identify the problem as Western countries applying their cultural 
standards to Chinese society.  The 20% of Xinhua’s articles that focus on the awarding 
of the Nobel Peace Price to dissident Liu Xiaobo blame the Nobel Prize Committee for 
causing this conflict.  Xinhua often refers to the decision of the award committee as 
politically motivated (Xinhua, 12 December 2010a), an interference in China’s internal 
affairs (Xinhua, 12 December 2010) and expresses disapproval of the organisation 
behind the Nobel Peace Prize: “The decision to award a convicted criminal only 
disgraces the Nobel Peace Prize itself and destroys its credibility in China (Xinhua, 17 
October 2010).  Cause in Xinhua’s ‘American intervention’ stories also focuses on the 
West’s undue interference in China’s domestic affairs.  More specifically, the cause of 
the problem is the United States creating an issue where there is none (Xinhua, 12 July 
2010, Xinhua, 9 May 2011).   
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 Xinhua American Media American Elites 
No Blame 60% 20.7% 34.5% 
Blame on China Only 1.8% 55.2% 51.7% 
Blame on United 
States Only 
18.2% 5.7% 3.4% 
Blame on Both China 
and United States 
 9.1% 3.4% 
Other Blame 20% 3.4% 6.9% 
Figure 18. 
 Most articles under the ‘Nobel Prize’ narrative do not suggest a solution, 
though most articles focused on American criticism do.  The solutions proposed by 
Xinhua for the ‘American intervention’ narrative largely involve the United States 
leaving China alone.  These articles request that the United States stop “its hegemonic 
practice of portraying itself as a human rights ‘preacher’” (Xinhua, 12 April 2011), and 
to “take concrete actions to improve its own human rights conditions, check and rectify 
its acts in the human rights field’ (Xinhua, 11 April 2011).  Dialogue is also 
occasionally suggested as solution in these articles, and offers the only overlap found 
between the American media and Xinhua regarding problem, cause and solution.  As 
in the American framing, dialogue is a secondary solution here, suggested in only 
18.2% of these articles, compared to 63.6% of these articles that suggest the solution is 
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solely the responsibility of the United States.  Figures 19 and 20 show the breakdown 
of solutions proposed by American and Chinese outlets:     
 
Figure 19. 
 
 
Figure 20. 
 
 
United States to Resolve Alone 64% No Solution 9% 
China to Resolve Alone 9% 
China and United States to Resolve Together 18% 
Solutions for 'American Intervention' Narrative 
No Solution 64% China to Resolve Alone 9% 
China to Resolve with Other Actor 18% 
Other Solution 9% 
Solution for 'Nobel Prize Narrative' 
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Hypothesis 3 and the Chinese Human Rights Case    
 Hypothesis 3 is evaluated in the next chapter, where the frames used by the 
American elites and media on both China’s and Vietnam’s human rights issues can be 
compared.  By grouping the results together, the analysis moves towards a stronger 
understanding the indexing effect on American journalists. 
 
Conclusions 
  
 Results from testing hypothesis 1 provide support for the hypothesis, indicating 
that responsibility and conflict frames are common across narratives and countries, 
while use of consequence frames varies.  By evaluating Xinhua’s framing in terms of 
two data sets, it appears that even within a country, preferred consequence frame 
structures is not a constant variable.  It follows that an understanding of what 
consequence frame structures might be adopted from a foreign source may first require 
an understanding of what stories are being told within the issue culture in that country.   
 In testing hypothesis 2, it was found that the framing of the issue never brings 
to question the legitimacy of the media’s origin country, even though this legitimacy is 
widely challenged by the foreign media.  Examples of self-blame are rare here, and 
confined to American journalists lamenting their country’s tolerance of human rights 
violations in China.  In no instances do the media question the universality of their 
definition of human rights, nor do any articles suggest that the origin country might be 
in violation of human rights itself.  While different interpretations of human rights do 
not directly question a country’s legitimacy, they do bring into question the legitimacy 
of actions taken if a new definition were to apply.  For instance, adopting China’s view 
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of human rights would challenge the legitimacy of a number of American laws and 
values. These findings therefore do support the hypothesis that frames challenging a 
country’s legitimacy will be omitted from that nation’s media.  These definitions were 
never questioned within the country’s own media, however, indicating that a foreign 
frame founded on culturally relative values is unlikely to be adopted.  The only 
common ground found in problem, cause and solution was the proposal of dialogue as 
a solution, though these proposals were uncommon.  Overall, it appears that frames 
questioning a country’s values and legitimacy will not be adopted from a foreign 
source.    
 From these findings, an answer to the question of what foreign frames are most 
likely to be adopted by a country’s media draws closer.  For instance, frame structure 
appears to make a difference on a frame’s use in the media.  While no clear 
preferences for frame structure appear isolated to countries, consequence frames have 
been found in each case study to be used less consistently.  Further, the type of 
consequence framing (human consequence, economic, security) used appears to be tied 
to the narrative being promoted—the likelihood of a foreign consequence frame being 
adopted is therefore reliant on the type of story being told through the media.  A 
clearer answer regarding the role of elites on international issues framing will 
hopefully result from the next chapter, where American framing of the Chinese and 
Vietnamese human rights issues will be compared. 
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6.  Case Study: Human Rights in Vietnam    
 The Vietnamese government has been accused of violating its citizens’ human 
rights, specifically freedom of speech and freedom of religion.  Organisations like 
Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have issued reports and statements 
condemning Vietnam’s attitudes towards human rights, as have government 
organisations like the US State Department.  The issue is a source of tension between 
the United States and Vietnam. 
 The American/Vietnamese political relationship has had a difficult past to 
overcome.  As former enemies of war, the United States and Vietnam have made a 
great deal of progress in their political and economic relationship since the conflict 
ended in 1975.  Diplomatic relations were not normalised until 1995.  Since this 
milestone, trade between the countries has skyrocketed and in 2009 bilateral trade 
passed $15 billion (Solomon, 2010).  Additionally, the Vietnam is a strategic political 
ally when it comes to standing up to China.  If the United States wishes to maintain 
any sort of relevance in eastern Asia, it is important that it maintain a positive 
relationship with countries like Vietnam. 
 Though little American action has been taken against Vietnam’s alleged human 
rights abuses, non-governmental organisations and other actors have vocalised strong 
disapproval of the Vietnamese Communist Party.  In general, American elites and 
other international actors seem more willing to criticise Vietnam than they are China.  
Brantly Womack, a professor of politics at the University of Virginia, suggests that this 
may be due to Vietnam standing in as a weaker version of neighbouring China, another 
country in which human rights are an issue.  Or, as Professor Womack succinctly puts 
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it: “Vietnam is a kickable China” (quoted in Pomfret, 2010).  In this case, some actors 
may see Vietnam as a country to be used to send a message to China. 
 Several US congressmen, notably Ed Royce (R), Loretta Sanchez (D) and Zoe 
Lofgren (D), all from California districts with large Vietnamese populations; Chris 
Smith (R) from New Jersey; and Joseph Cao (R) from Louisiana (the first and only 
Vietnamese-American to serve in Congress), have been especially vocal about this 
problem.  Specifically, they have suggested an appropriate American response would 
be to place Vietnam on the State Department’s list of ‘Countries of Particular Concern’ 
(CPC).  The countries identified as CPCs are “nations guilty of particularly severe 
violations of religious freedom” (U.S. State Department) and are usually punished with 
economic sanctions.  Vietnam was placed on the list in 2004, though was removed in 
2006.  International non-profit groups like Human Rights Watch, as well as American 
politicians have requested that the State Department re-designate Vietnam as a CPC in 
order to pressure Vietnam into respecting religious freedoms.  Despite this urging, the 
State Department has not added Vietnam to the list. 
 In April 2011, Congressman Smith put forth the Vietnam Human Rights Act of 
2011.  This resolution, if passed, would prohibits any increase in American non-
humanitarian aid to Vietnam until the country makes major inroads in protecting basic 
human rights.  The politicians involved in this bill hope that it will pressure the 
Vietnamese government into releasing its political and religious prisoners as well as 
fighting against human trafficking.  Fostering support for this bill, as well as putting 
pressure on the State Department to reclassify Vietnam, has been a major focus of a 
handful of vocal politicians during the observed time period. 
 Vietnamese spokespeople have responded to allegations of human rights abuse 
by suggesting that human rights are culturally relevant values and differ from country 
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to country.  Pham Gia Khiem, Vietnam’s Foreign Minister, has stated “Human rights 
cannot be imposed from the outside,” (Solomon, 2010) implying that the United States 
and other international actors have no role to play in the issue.  Vietnam has also 
suggested that accusations of human rights violations are based on misinformation and 
political pursuits.  The country is quick to point out the progress is has made in the 
area of human rights as well as the measures it continues to take to improve the lives of 
its citizens. 
 Like the case study involving human rights in China, this case provides a useful 
example of international framing of an issue complicated by cultural relativity.  
Additionally, the results here will be compared to the American media and elite 
framing of the Chinese issue, illustrating the extent to which the American media is 
sensitive to the American political relationships with China and Vietnam. 
 
Hypothesis 1 and the Vietnamese Human Rights Case  
  
 Responsibility frames are present in 72.2% of the articles from the Vietnam 
Foreign Press Centre and all of the articles from the American media.  Once again, 
common use of these frames is found across countries.  This supports the hypothesis 
and suggests that these frames may be the most likely frame structure to be adopted 
from a foreign source.  Conflict frames are used in all of the American media articles, 
though only 38.9% of Vietnamese articles.  This is the second time in this research that 
the findings from a case study challenge the hypothesis’s prediction about the frequent 
use of consequence frames.  In the Agent Orange Study, it was suggested that the 
passage of time could have made conflict frames less applicable to the issue—a 
suggestion that does not apply to this issue.  Additionally, conflict frames were found 
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often in the Chinese framing of its human rights issue, indicating that their use may be 
relative to national preferences and media practises.  Figure 21 shows the use of frame 
types for this issue:    
 
 Vietnam Foreign Press 
Centre 
American Media 
Conflict Framing 38.9% 100% 
Responsibility Framing 72.2% 100% 
Human Consequence 
Framing 
 57.6% 
Economic Framing  34.6% 
Figure 21.  
 Use of consequence frames in this case study also supports the hypothesis.  No 
consequence frame structures were ever used by the Vietnamese media to describe the 
issue, though human consequence frames and economic frames are both used often by 
the American media.  44% of articles from the American media use the effect of the 
issue on Vietnamese individuals and communities as the focus of the article.  16.7% of 
the American media articles also indicate that the issue is tied to Vietnam’s economy.  
In these cases, the human rights issue is often seen as a cause of tension between the 
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United States and Vietnam, one that hinders Vietnam’s overall development (The Wall 
Street Journal, 23 July 2010).  As in each of the other case studies, frequency of 
consequence frames is found to change from issue to issue and even among countries 
within an issue.  This could indicate that a consequence frame used in one country is 
unlikely to be found equally salient to another country, limiting its chance of being 
adopted. 
Hypothesis 2 and the Vietnamese Human Rights Case    The previous case study examined the frames used to address the human rights 
situation in China.  That study found very little common ground between the countries 
regarding problem, cause and solution.  The details of Vietnam’s human rights issue 
are similar to China’s—the United States alleges the Asian country is violating its 
citizen’s rights, and the Asian country argues that the United States is unfairly 
applying its own standards to other cultures—and so it is expected to feature similar 
framing.   
 Table 5 offers a summary of common frames used in this issue:  
Table 5. Summary of Most Common Conflict, Cause and Solution by Outlet 
 Vietnam Foreign Press 
Centre 
American Media 
Conflict Western countries unjustly 
accusing Vietnam of human 
rights violations 
Vietnam violating the 
human rights of its 
citizens 
Cause Western political agendas Vietnamese 
government is 
oppressive, United 
States not doing 
enough 
Solution Vietnam to improve education 
about its human rights 
policies; Vietnamese National 
Assembly to improve human 
rights legislation; Vietnam to 
engage with other countries 
on human rights issue  
United States to 
pressure Vietnam for 
reforms 
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 As in the case of China’ human rights, the American media identifies the 
problem as an oppressive government violating its citizen’s human rights (80.8% of 
American articles identify a conflict between Vietnamese parties).  Like Xinhua, the 
Vietnamese outlet also publishes some articles that offer no problem, cause, nor 
solution (27.8%).  Again, these come in the form of ‘all is well’ statements and can be 
seen as symptomatic of a state-controlled media system.  When problems are 
identified, the Vietnam Foreign Press Centre indicates that the issue was not a 
Vietnamese violation of human rights, but a problem created and subsequently 
exploited by the West for political purposes (27.8% of articles present this problem as 
a conflict between the United States and Vietnam). 
 Within the Vietnamese articles identifying blame, all is placed on the United 
States and other Western actors (22.2% of Vietnamese articles place blame on the 
United States, while 16.7% place blame on an other actor (not Vietnamese, American 
or Chinese), and 5.6% place blame on both the United States and another actor) and 
never on Vietnam.  According to Vietnamese spokespeople, the cause of the problem 
is that critics are making “biased and misguided comments that do not rightly reflect 
the Vietnamese state’s policy on and implementation of human rights” (Voice of 
Vietnam, 31 May 2010).  In one article, the U.S. State Department is accused of 
making “politically intentional and partial comments on Vietnam that do not reflect 
rightly the real situation” (VNA, 17 June 2010), “partial remarks based on untrue 
information” (Vietnam News, 15 March 2010) and “offering opinions that interfered in 
[Vietnam]’s internal affairs” (Vietnam News, April 11 2011).   
 The American media, on the other hand, identifies the cause as the oppressive 
Vietnamese government, placing blame on Vietnam in all of these articles.  
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Responsibility for solution, however, is often awarded to the United States.  50% of 
articles from the American media suggest the United States should step in and resolve 
the issue, while 34.6% suggest that Vietnam can resolve it.  11.5% do not recommend 
any solution.  A similar imbalance between who is causing the problem and who can 
resolve it is found in the coverage from the Vietnamese media.  Though the Vietnam 
Foreign Press Centre largely blames the problem on the West, the Vietnamese articles 
never suggest that a non-Vietnamese actor can resolve the issue.  Rather, the 38.9% of 
articles that do propose a solution suggest that Vietnam is the sole country that can 
resolve the issue.  Specific solutions are varied and include Vietnam’s willingness to 
“share its experiences and learn from other nations in ensuring the rights of minority 
groups” (‘Vietnam respects rights of minorities’, 2010), the launch of a magazine 
designed to “disseminate the Party’s standpoints and guidelines as well as the State’s 
policies and laws on human rights” (Voice of Vietnam, 15 July 2010) as well as 
drafting new laws in the National Assembly to further protect human rights (DTI 
News, 5 January 2011).  Solutions proposed by the Vietnam Foreign Press Centre tend 
to be one-off propositions, and often reflect actions that had already been taken.   
 In both countries, the problems, causes and solutions identified are compatible 
with the nation’s values and norms.  In neither instance are the conceptions of what 
constitutes ‘human rights questioned, nor is there any suggestion that the problem may 
be due to the media’s origin country acting immorally or illegally.  As in the case of 
human rights in China, this issue provided an opportunity for journalists to question 
established norms and values and to weigh them against those from another culture, 
and as in the Chinese case, these challenges are not voiced.  That this type of framing 
is absent in both of these case studies supports hypothesis 2, indicating that avoiding 
challenges to legitimacy is an important factor in the adoption of foreign frames. 
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Hypothesis 3 and the Vietnamese Human Rights Case   
 The benefit of testing this hypothesis is to contribute to the understanding of 
how strong the indexing effect is when it comes to media frames on international 
issues.  The superficially similar case studies of Chinese and Vietnamese human rights 
provided an especially good opportunity to test the indexing hypothesis and hopefully 
move scholarship closer towards an understanding of the role elites play in shaping 
media framing.  As the Chinese and Vietnamese issues are quite similar it can be 
expected that they will be framed in a similar manner by the American media.  For 
instance, if the American media accepts that human rights are a culturally relative idea 
in the context of Chinese violations, the same philosophy should apply towards the 
Vietnamese.   
 Despite this expectation, differences in the coverage were found.  Figure 22 
shows that in important areas where framing of the Chinese and Vietnamese issues 
differed, the American media tends to follow the lead of the American elites.  For 
instance, both groups place blame and disapproval on Vietnam more frequently than 
they do on China, and both groups recommend American intervention as a solution 
more often in Vietnam than in China.  It would seem that Vietnam is indeed treated 
like a “kickable China” by both American elites and the media.  Additionally, China’s 
holding of American debt may make any American conflict with this country more 
economically harmful than a conflict with Vietnam.   
  111 
 
 American Media American Elites 
Disapproval of Vietnam 64.3% 81.5% 
Disapproval of China 47.1% 65.5% 
Blame on Vietnam 94% 88.9% 
Blame on China 70.1% 51.7% 
Solution is American 
Intervention in Vietnam 
52.4% 66.7% 
Solution is American 
Intervention in China 
29.9% 27.6% 
Figure 22. 
 The United States elites and media both use economic frames more often in 
articles about human rights violations in China than they do to describe the same issue 
in Vietnam.  21.8% of American media and 86.2% of elites present the Chinese issue 
as having economic consequences, compared to 17.9% of American media and 7.4% 
of elites on the Vietnamese issue.  Additionally, the content of these frames is 
different.  When describing the Chinese issue, economics become the reason China 
cannot be pressured into developing human rights (Newsweek, 8 February 2010, The 
Wall Street Journal, 18 May 2011), while articles describing the Vietnamese issue 
suggest that human rights violations are the reason Vietnam cannot be helped in 
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reforming its economy (The Wall Street Journal, 23 July 2010, Congressional 
Documents and Publications, 16 July 2010).  The different use of economic framing of 
the issue by the American outlets further highlights the fact that China has economic 
leverage over the United States, whereas Vietnam does not.   
 The human consequence framing of American coverage of the human rights 
violations is also off-balance in relation to the issue in China and the issue in Vietnam 
(see Figure 23).  Both American outlets consistently see the problem as an oppressive 
government, and it is not unusual for them to use anecdotes or personal examples to 
illustrate the problem and perhaps make it more available and applicable to the 
audience.  However, the Vietnamese issue receives over twice as much coverage from 
a human consequence perspective than does the Chinese issue—44% of American 
media and 57.7% of elite statements make the effect of the issue on Vietnamese 
citizens the focus of the story, compared to 17.2% of media articles and 11.8% of elite 
statements on the Chinese issue.   
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 American Media American Elites 
Vietnam Issue 44% 57.7% 
China Issue 17.2% 11.8% 
Figure 23. 
  
Conclusions    
 Findings from testing the first hypothesis were mixed, though mostly 
supportive of the hypothesis.  Specifically, this case study finds a consistent and 
frequent use of responsibility frames, a finding that suggests that these frame types are 
more likely to be found relevant across countries and therefore more likely to be 
adopted by a foreign source.  The opposite can be said about consequence frames, a 
finding which is also consistent with the hypothesis.  In fact, the only challenge to the 
hypothesis was the irregular use of conflict framing.  Based on the results from each of 
the case studies, it appears that conflict framing is less pervasively used than 
responsibility framing, but also less variable than consequence framing.  The 
conclusion to be drawn from this is that conflict frames are likely based in context, 
however the circumstances that engender conflict framing are far broader than those 
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that result in consequence framing.  In other words, conflict frames are more likely 
than consequence frames to be relevant across countries, though some issues may be 
less accommodating to their use than others. 
 Again, hypothesis 2 was supported by the results.  The problems that are 
identified are consistent with disparate interpretations of ‘human rights’, and the 
causes and solutions further support the attitudes of the media’s nation of origin.  Self-
blame is a rare occurrence, and when it was found it appeared in the context of 
American elites and media feeling that the United States was not doing enough to 
ensure human rights are respected in Vietnam.  There are no instances of framing that 
challenge one country’s legitimacy being found in their media, despite the presence of 
such framing in another country.  Based on these findings, it can be concluded that it is 
extremely unlikely for a challenging, foreign frame to be adopted by another country’s 
media. 
 The findings of this case study shine some light on the relationship between the 
American media and the American elites.  By comparing the American framing of the 
Chinese human rights issue to that of the Vietnamese human rights issue, the influence 
of the elites on the media is visible.  For instance, the press followed the example set 
by the elites and blamed Vietnam more often than China while simultaneously giving 
more responsibility for the resolution to China than Vietnam.  This points to more 
implicit political sensitivity to the American relationships with China and Vietnam 
than a completely ‘free’ press would be expected to show.  Though the American elites 
are not likely to be the only factor guiding American media framing, the results of the 
case study do point to a strong influence. 
 The disparate use of consequence frames is of note, and possibly caused by the 
American elites (and, assuming the indexing theory has some effect, the American 
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media) feeling that the human rights issue in China is complicated by the relationship 
between China and the United States, thus making it too complex to see as a purely 
human consequence story.  Additionally, evoking sympathy for the Chinese citizens 
among the American audience may create a popular opinion that action must be taken, 
which (based on the findings from the analysis of solution framing), the United States 
is less eager to do in China than in Vietnam.   
 Through the results of four case studies, several patterns can now be identified 
pointing to what foreign frames are most likely to be adopted by another country’s 
media.  First, foreign frames that challenge a country’s legitimacy are likely to be 
ignored, marginalised or disputed by that country’s media.  Such messages should 
therefore be avoided in any attempt to influence a foreign country’s media.  Second, 
consequence and conflict frame structures may be less relevant in certain countries and 
in certain contexts.  Relevance of consequence frames, especially, appears highly 
reliant on context, making them less likely to be equally salient across cultures.  Third, 
evidence of elite indexing was found, however the media also deviated from elite 
messaging on several occasions.  While elites may influence the general direction of 
the debate, it appears that oppositional frames from foreign sources do have an 
opportunity to enter the framing competition.  The significance of these findings, and 
their application to public diplomacy, will be further developed in the next chapter. 
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7.  Conclusion 
 
 As previous research has shown, media framing can have a significant effect on 
public opinion (Entman, 2004, Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007: 11).  Of course, not all 
potential frames will be adopted and promoted by the media, meaning that entering the 
framing competition is the first step to a message influencing an audience.  The 
purpose of this study was to move towards a better understanding of what traits make 
certain frames more likely to be adopted by foreign media and how these traits might 
be used in public diplomacy.  Through this, it may be possible to gauge the likelihood 
of a news frame influencing the media of a foreign country through advocacy or 
international broadcasting, allowing a message to successfully speak to an audience at 
home and abroad. 
 To answer the research question, this thesis sought to identify what frame 
attributes are commonly used across different countries.  Identifying existing frames 
provides an understanding of what ideas and attitudes constitute public opinion in a 
target audience country, suggesting a foundation for public diplomacy messages.  
Three hypotheses were tested in this study, in the hopes of developing a stronger 
understanding of framing of international issues in China, Vietnam and the United 
States.  Though the conclusions are specific to these countries, it is hoped that some of 
the lessons can be applied to public diplomacy in general. 
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Conclusions from Testing Hypothesis 1  
 
 The first hypothesis focused on the types of frames used to explain 
international issues to domestic audiences.  The benefit of evaluating this hypothesis is 
to better understand what, if any, frame structures might prohibit a message from being 
applicable across countries.  Based on previous studies, it was suggested that conflict 
and responsibility frames would be widely used to describe such issues.  In Figure 24, 
we see the use of frame types across outlets for all issues combined: 
 
 Xinhua Vietnam Foreign 
Press Centre 
American Media 
Conflict Frames 57.1% 43.8% 82.1% 
Responsibility 
Frames 
52.3% 70.3% 78.9% 
Human Consequence 
Frames 
15.5% 6.3% 35.3% 
Economic Frames 16.7% 6.3% 33.2% 
Security Frames 13.1% 4.7% 18.9% 
Figure 24. 
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Conflict and Responsibility Framing 
 Overall, it was found that the United States, China and Vietnam do regularly 
use conflict and responsibility frames as a way to explain international issues.  
Combined with data from previous studies finding these frames common in European 
media (Semetko and Valkenburg, 2000, Camaj, 2010), it appears that these frames 
have a general applicability.   
 Despite general support for the first part of the hypothesis, this thesis did find 
one issue in which conflict frames were not commonly used.  The figure on the 
following page (Figure 25) shows the use of conflict frames among the outlets on a per 
issue basis and the rare use of conflict frames in the Agent Orange case study stands 
out.  In this case study, the American media never used conflict frames and the 
Vietnamese media used them only rarely, indicating that there may be certain contexts 
in which these frames are not applicable.  Again, this outlier may be due to the 
decades-long time span of the issue and the irrelevance of framing the issuing the 
context of the original conflict, a possibility that would require further research to 
confirm. 
  119 
 
 Xinhua Vietnam Foreign 
Press Centre 
American Media 
Spratly Islands 86.2% 73.7% 76.9% 
Agent Orange  11.1%  
Human Rights in 
China 
41.8%  82.8% 
Human Rights in 
Vietnam 
 38.9% 76.9% 
Figure 25. 
 
Consequence Framing 
 No particular consequence frames were found to be more generally used that 
the others.  They were also used unevenly among the three countries studied.  Again, 
this is consistent with the hypothesis.  This may suggest that consequence frames may 
have limited use in public diplomacy—it appears unlikely that a particular 
consequence frame structure that appeals to an audience in one culture will also appeal 
to an audience in another.  Likely, these frames are more reliant on context than either 
responsibility or conflict frames and will not be as widely applicable. 
 When the data are grouped together as consequence frames, rather than viewed 
separately as ‘economic’, ‘human consequence’, and ‘security’ frames, a trend (visible 
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in Figure 26) emerges within each country.  Overall, consequence frames appear 
extremely common among American media, moderately common at Xinhua and 
uncommon at the Vietnam Foreign Press Centre.  The use of consequence framing 
should perhaps therefore be linked to the system of media ownership in place.  The 
outlet with the least commercialisation (the Vietnam Foreign Press Centre) was 
significantly less likely to use consequence framing in their news stories.  This trend 
may indicate a relationship between consequence framing and the privately-owned 
news outlets (which may be more inclined to dramatise the issue though candidly 
explaining the consequences of the problem).   
 
 
 Xinhua Vietnam Foreign 
Press Centre 
American Media 
Conflict Frames 57.1% 43.8% 82.1% 
Responsibility 
Frames 
52.3% 70.3% 78.9% 
Consequence Frames 45.2% 17.3% 87.2% 
Figure 26. 
 
0 10 
20 30 
40 50 
60 70 
80 90 
100 
Xinhua  Vietnam Foreign Press Centre  American Media 
%
 o
f a
rt
ic
le
s 
Conflict, Responsibility and Consequence Framing Among 
Outlets 
ConUlict Framing Responsibility Framing Consequence Framing 
  121 
 These findings on frame structure use support the results of Camaj’s (2010) 
study on frame usage by European media on the subject of Kosovo’s status 
negotiations, a study that also found news outlets favouring conflict and responsibility 
frames regardless of the outlet’s national origins.  Camaj used these findings to further 
the hypothesis that news media is becoming increasingly homogenised through 
processes of globalisation.  It was not the intention of this thesis to test the effects of 
globalisation on news framing, but it is difficult not to draw the same conclusion when 
these results are compared to Camaj’s—the fully-commercialised American media had 
more in common with the partially-commercialised Chinese media than with the state-
run Vietnamese media.   
 The type and frequency of consequence framing describing this issue varied 
across countries.  This indicates that certain consequences appear to hold more 
relevance to different audiences.  Interestingly, the results suggest that successful use 
of these frame types may be more tied to current social and political concerns than to 
the actual likelihood or significance of the consequence.  For instance, the case study 
of the Spratly Islands provided the most likely issue for security frames as this issue is 
a territorial dispute between Asian countries, and the question of regional security and 
stability naturally follows.  Indeed, the frame was found among all of the outlets, but 
especially the American media—the country that would be the least effected by a 
conflict in the South China Sea.  While such a conflict is unlikely to affect the average 
American, the concern over global security issues is consistent with a general 
American approach to international affairs.  Since the events of September 11, 2001, 
terrorism, war and threats to international security have grown increasingly more 
relevant to Americans (Chanley, 2002: 478).  The lesson here may be that consequence 
frames used in public diplomacy may be most effective after taking a moment to 
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understand the issues important to the target audience, such as via recent opinion polls 
or media analyses.   
 While conflict and responsibility frames are common across all cultures, 
findings around consequence frames may be more flexible and apt for use in public 
diplomacy.  While conflict and responsibility frames, by nature, cast two parties 
against each other, consequence frames may be used in a less adversarial manner.  The 
Agent Orange case study, the only case where conflict frames were uncommon and the 
only case where both countries agreed on the problem, cause and solution, provides a 
strong example of this.  Though they vary in use, each of the consequence frames are 
presented at some point by each country indicating that any of them could potentially 
influence another country’s media.  Additionally, use of consequence frames appears 
influenced by the level or privatisation of the media.  With preliminary research 
identifying a country’s largest, most relevant concerns, consequence frame structures 
may have a great deal of potential as effective formats for public diplomacy messages.    
Conclusions from Testing Hypothesis 2   
 The second hypothesis posited that framing from one country would not be 
presented by another’s media if it challenges the audience country’s legitimacy, an 
idea largely supported by the findings.  In none of these case studies is contentious 
framing present in the domestic media, even though many cases identified the 
existence of such framing in other countries.      
 The case studies on human rights in China and Vietnam perhaps support the 
hypothesis most clearly.  On one side of the issue, American framing argues that the 
Asian governments violate the civil liberties of their citizens.  On the other, the Asian 
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countries argue that the United States is misrepresenting violations as an excuse to 
intercede in China and Vietnam’s domestic affairs.  Additionally, framing from Xinhua 
challenges the American government’s legitimacy by casting the United States as the 
violator of human rights—citing poverty and gun violence statistics as evidence.  
These challenging frames were not acknowledged by the American media, and while 
the Asian media did occasionally mention the American criticism, it was always in the 
context of a rebuttal to it.   
 The case of the Spratly Islands identified similar, though less incendiary, 
challenges to legitimacy—Xinhua indicated that the United States had no right to 
intervene, yet while the necessity of intervention was debated by the Americans, their 
country’s right to get involved was never questioned.  In no instance did journalists 
question their country’s definition of human rights, or their country’s respect of them.  
It would seem that common use of a frame in one country is not enough to earn it entry 
into the framing competition in another country.   
 These findings are consistent with most research on international issues 
framing, though this idea has been challenged on occasion.  As mentioned previously, 
one case study on American coverage of Guatemalan death squads (Livingston and 
Eachus, 1996) does find that frames challenging local legitimacy were used regularly 
by the mainstream media.  Incidentally, this case study shares a particular quality with 
the only case study in this thesis to find similar challenges to local legitimacy.  In the 
case study involving Agent Orange reparations, the United States was unanimously 
blamed for the problem.  It was noted that conflict frames were rarely used in this 
issue, and this may give the blame less of an adversarial tone and make it easier for the 
American audience to accept.   
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 More likely though, the challenges to legitimacy are accepted due to the 
amount of time that has passed between the Vietnam War and today.   This is 
consistent with Livingston and Eachus’s (1996) study on Guatemalan death squads.  
They compared American framing of Latin American paramilitary organisation before 
and after the Cold War, and found that after the Cold War, American media was much 
more inclined to explicitly identify the American government as complicit with violent 
and illegitimate organisations.  While they ultimately attribute this to a new political 
and social climate following the Cold War, they do acknowledge that their second 
study was on an issue long passed, which could have affected results (1996: 434).  
That their finding has not been followed by more post-Cold War, mediated challenges 
to legitimacy may identify it as an exception rather than a rule, much like the Agent 
Orange study appears here. 
 Overall, the case studies indicate that the details of problem, cause and solution 
presented in a frame are extremely important for public diplomacy messages.  If a 
frame is too challenging to the audience country’s current sense of its legitimacy, it 
simply will not be acknowledged.  Though a number of studies have indicated that the 
media is willing to present frames that oppose elite statement (Wolfsfeld, 1997, 
Althaus, 2003), it appears that a line is drawn at challenging the legitimacy of the 
current status quo, indicating that this could be the point at which journalists will limit 
their storytelling.  The implications of this on the practise of public diplomacy should 
be obvious: antagonistic framing will not be compatible with the audience’s sense of 
reality, and such frames are not likely to influence local media.   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Conclusions from Testing Hypothesis 3   
 The third hypothesis sought to uncover the nature of the relationship between 
elite statements and local media framing.  Each of the case studies finds that while the 
media does occasionally offer competing frames, the general direction of elite framing 
is followed.  Findings from the Spratly Islands issue demonstrated some deviation of 
the media from elite framing, though this was not a significant challenge, and 
American media framing of the Agent Orange issue mirrored American elite framing 
almost perfectly.  The comparison of framing on the human rights in Vietnam and 
China perhaps provided the strongest evidence of indexing.  Here, the American media 
followed the framing of the elites within the issue, subsequently demonstrating a bias 
towards contrasting solutions of intervention in Vietnam and a more hands-off 
approach with China.   
 That the strength of indexing may vary from issue to issue has been suggested 
before, though no definitive answer as to the cause has emerged.  Bennett (1990: 122) 
proposes that one factor that may influence the indexing effect is the importance of the 
issue to American corporate interests.  Possibly, issues bearing more relevance towards 
maintaining the current order would be less likely to introduce multiple voices and 
viewpoints, whereas issues that appear more trivial will feature more different frames.  
Though the bearing each of the case study issues has on American corporate interests 
is purely speculative, this does not appear to be a major factor in the American media’s 
adoption or deviation from American elite framing.   
 First, the issue of Agent Orange reparations featured the most consistent and 
similar framing from the media and elites, though this issue arguably has the least 
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relevance to maintaining the corporate or political status quo.  The human rights issues, 
in which media framing also closely followed elite framing, can be seen as slightly 
more relevant—the issues create tension between the United States and its trade 
partners—though still not critical to maintaining the current order.  The Spratly Islands 
issue is easily the most relevant to the United States’ government and economy—even 
if the threat to global security is an exaggeration, security and economic issues in Asia 
can have an effect on the international systems that the United States participates in—
and indicated the least amount of correlation between elite and media framing. 
  Perhaps a stronger explanation for the varying strength of elite indexing is the 
existence of a ‘storytelling imperative’ among journalists.  Cook (1996: 479) suggests 
that American news values mandating news be “timely, terse, easily described, 
dramatic, colorful and visualizeable” will often drive journalists to add new plot 
elements to their stories.  These elements do not constitute new frames, but rather build 
upon those already suggested by elites.  Althaus (2003) makes a similar observation in 
his study of Persian Gulf crisis, noting that oppositional frames in the media fell within 
one of four identified narratives.  While he does not mention whether any of these 
particular narratives were used by elites, it can be inferred that the media relies on a 
handful of established frames to present an issue.  As was found in each of the case 
studies here, in instances where the American media promoted frames that had not 
been used by elites, these frames added to or argued with the existing frames (such as 
the emphasis on American security consequences in the Spratly Islands case or the 
alternative solutions proposed in the issue of Vietnam’s human rights).  Never did the 
media introduce an entirely new idea.  Based on the findings in this thesis, each of 
these larger narratives appears grounded in elite framing, albeit with the media adding 
elements of drama to create new frames. 
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 This research points to another possible explanation for varying degrees of 
indexing: findings suggest that in cases where local elite framing has not yet been 
consolidated into a handful of recurrent frames, it may be possible for alternative 
frames to directly influence the media.  Figure 27 shows the correlation between the 
percentage of American media articles that suggest no solution (indicating an 
incomplete frame) and the consensus among American elites as to the best solution 
(implying the number of frames being promoted by elites).  Though lacking enough 
data to come to a definitive conclusion, the chart suggests a negative correlation 
between elite consolidation of frames and number of frames employed by the media.  
 
Figure 27. 
 
 It is possible that the strength of indexing is related to the consistency of elite 
messaging.  If there are only one or two narratives promoted, then the media follows; if 
there are more, the media may be more open to new frames.  The two case studies that 
show the least consistent framing, the issues of the Spratly Islands and human rights in 
China, are also the two case studies that appeared to have the most deviation from elite 
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framing in terms of frame structure.  Mermin (1999: 116) reported similar findings in a 
case study on American military intervention in Somalia—an outlier in his research 
which otherwise largely supported the indexing theory.  He concluded that the frequent 
use of oppositional frames in the media coverage was due to the administration 
appearing “uncertain and confused” regarding their foreign policy in Somalia.  This 
finding may be easily explained through previous research on strong framing, which 
indicates that repetition of a single theme is a major factor in the success of a frame 
(Chong and Druckman, 2007).  Possibly, without the repetition of certain frames from 
the elites, the media has trouble identifying strong frames for an issue and is more 
willing to look elsewhere.  This may indicate an opening for public diplomacy 
messages to enter the framing competition. 
 This finding could be useful as a way to identify opportunities to introduce 
frames through public diplomacy communications.  It should be noted though, that this 
finding is unlikely to hold true for countries with one-party systems, like Vietnam or 
China.  In these countries, debate among the elites may be non-existent and 
opportunities to enter the framing competition may therefore be considerably more 
limited.  In these cases, public diplomacy messages may struggle to enter the framing 
competition through directly influencing local media.    
 The bearing this conclusion has on public diplomacy is in the process through 
which a public diplomacy message is most likely to influence a foreign public, as 
suggested by the cascading activation model (Entman, 2008).  Though the model 
indicates that international news frames could influence local media directly, and 
though other studies have found foreign sources are common in American news stories 
(Wolfsfeld, 1997, Althaus, 2003), this thesis found no evidence of non-elite influence 
on framing.  Rather, the findings from testing this hypothesis point to one thing: that 
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while framing may occasionally present stories that fall outside of the elite-sanctioned 
Sphere of Legitimate Debate, they will not fall far.  Most likely, frames will deviate 
from elite framing only to make the issue more fitting with a dramatic narrative, and 
such liberties are more likely to be taken in cases where elite opinion on the issue is 
not consolidated.  Overall, these results support Althaus, Edy, Entman and Phalan’s 
(1996: 411) revision of the indexing hypothesis in which they suggest that while elites 
may not be the most commonly cited source in news stories, their focus still guides 
much of the coverage.   
 
Discussion 
 
 Framing represents the way information about an event or issue is processed 
and presented.  Journalists are tasked with identifying the most important details of a 
story and linking them together to explain what happened, who is involved and why it 
matters.  Stories are written so as to communicate the event or issue to a specific 
audience, and will use frames that are already established as relevant to and understood 
by their audience.  Different contexts lead to different framing, and it comes as no 
surprise that journalists across borders and cultures often come up with completely 
different ways to explain the same event.  These news frames can therefore be a useful 
way to ‘listen’ in public diplomacy and determine existing attitudes and opinions of the 
target audience.  Stories form the foundation of how we understand experiences, and 
the stories that make sense to an audience can tell us a great deal about their attitudes, 
values and experiences.   
 Presenting an issue in a way that is consistent with local framing will ensure 
that a message is understood and not just heard.  Through considered framing, an issue 
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can be presented in a way that emphasises commonality, not differences.  Even if the 
policies promoted are not widely supported by the audience, even if disagreement 
remains, the message will at least have been understood.  This is not to suggest that 
public diplomats pander to an audience without regard to foreign policy activity.  A 
government’s unpopular actions should still be framed in a way that the audience will 
be able to relate to.  Chong and Druckman (2007) point out that strong framing 
opposing a held opinion can push and audience towards a more moderate opinion, 
though the idea itself may not be wholly adopted.  It follows that relevant and 
consistent framing can positively influence public opinion, even when the overall 
interpretation of an issue differs.   
 Strong framing is not a panacea for bad policy.  If the actions of one country 
negatively affect the citizens of another, no storytelling technique can fix that.  Rather, 
framing should be seen as a tool for listening and for facilitating dialogue.  As was 
demonstrated in the case studies here, there are ways to create a message that will not 
likely be accepted by a foreign audience—by questioning held values like human 
rights, or challenging the audience country’s legitimacy.  These frames can do nothing 
to further the goals of public diplomacy, and should be avoided whenever possible.  
Again, careful framing cannot make an unpopular policy popular, but it can highlight 
the similar values and ideas that drive the policy.   
 It is the job of public diplomacy scholars and practitioners to develop and test 
theories in order to bridge that divide.  Through the case studies here, this study 
intended to add to knowledge regarding use of framing in international 
communications and effective public diplomacy.  The conclusions outlined in this 
chapter are theoretical only—each suggestion should be trialled in advocacy or 
international broadcasting before an evaluation of its actual usefulness can be made.  
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Success of the frame could easily be observed through its adoption or disregard by the 
local media or through public opinion polls.  It is through constant testing and retesting 
of theories in a practical context that we can move closer to an understanding of how 
messages can be framed so that they are understood by international audiences. 
 This study also uncovered areas in need of further research, especially in 
regards to the findings of the Agent Orange case study.  Here, the framing from the 
two countries were similar, even though the framing placed the blame on the United 
States—the only case where self-blame was part of a strong frame.  As noted, the 
timeline and context of this issue may be what makes it unique among the others.  
However, a longitudinal study of American framing of the Agent Orange issue could 
be used to establish when the American media and elites began adopting this frame, 
and what actors were involved.  As mentioned, American war veterans also suffer from 
the effects of Agent Orange, and it is possible that the precedent set by policies 
towards veterans have resulted in the willingness to take responsibility for the effects 
of Agent Orange in Vietnam.  If this is the case, then it may be useful for public 
diplomacy messages to seek out domestic issues relating to the foreign policy issue and 
adopt similar framing.  The knowledge base surrounding public diplomacy will only 
continue to grow through scholarship and practice.  It is therefore critical that we 
continue developing and testing theories to better understand how to more effectively 
communicate across borders—improved public diplomacy is our best chance at 
bridging the divide that hinders international communication.  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